* LI BRARY OF CONGRE SS. #1 



|ILVITED STATES OF AMEEICA.JI 



















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Field Service in War: 



- 

COMPRISING 


Marches, 


Convoys, 


Camps and Cantonments, 


Reconnaissances, 


Outposts, 


Foraging, 



And Notes on Logistics. 

By FRANCIS J. LIPPITT, 

Late Colonel 2d California Infantry, 
Brevet Brigadier General United States Volunteers. 



AUTHOR OF 



' TACTICAL USE OF THE THREE ARMS," " INTRENCHMENTS,' 
AND "THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF WAR." 




HEW YORK: 

D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER, No. 23 MURRAY STREET. 

18G9. 



rlO 



^ 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year of our Lord 1869. 

By FRANCIS J. LIPPITT, 

In the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, for the District 
of Rhode Island. 



PROVIDENCE: 

MILLARD & HARKER, PRINTERS, 57 WEYBOSSET STREET. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

MARCHES. 4 

I. Preliminary Dispositions. 5 

IT. Order of March. 7 

III. Columns of 31 arch. 11 

* IV. Conduct of the March, 22 

V. Advance guard. 29 

YI. Duties of the Advance Guard. 35 

YII. Flank and Other Patrols. 39 

VIII. Rear Guard. 42 

- IX. Trains. ' 42 

CAMPS AKD CANTONMENTS. , 5^ 

I. Camps. 55 

II. Cantonments. 60 

OUTPOSTS. 65 

1. Generally. 65 

II. Grand Guards. 74 

III. Pickets. 79 

IY. Duties of Pickets. 82 

Y. Sentinels. * 86 

YI. Patrols. 89 

YII. Duties of a Commander of the'^Outposts. 91 

• 95 
95 
97 
101 
105 
107 
109 
112 



CONVOYS. 


I. 


General Dispositions. 


II. 


The Train and its March. 


III. 


The Escort and its March 


IY. 


Passage of Defiles. 


V. 


Parking of the Train. 


YI. 


Defence of a Convoy. 


VII. 


Attack of a Convoy. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

FORAGING. 115 

RECONNAISSANCES. 119 

I. Objfcts of a Reconnaissance. 119 

II. How Made. 121 

III. Offensive Patrols. 125 

NOTES ON LOGISTICS. 129 

I. As to Supplies Generally. 129 

fll. Magazines. 140 

III. Transportation. 143 

IY. Reduction of Transportation. 151 



FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 



§gj^N every campaign, an army must perform 
Marches ; must pitch Camps, and sometimes 
occupy more permanent quarters, or Can- 
tonments ; must be guarded against surprise by 
Outposts ; must receive, from time to time, 
Convoys of supplies ; must procure subsistence 
for its cavalry and artillery horses, and its 
draught and other baggage animals by Fora- 
oing ; and must ascertain the position, strength 
and movements of the enemy by Reconnais- 
sances. 

All these heads, taken together, make up the 
subject of Field Service in War ; which may be 
defined as comprising those subsidiary opera- 
tions and dispositions of an army ivhich are 
necessarily incidental to a campaign. 



4 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

An Army Corps, or other considerable force 
will be supposed : but the same principles will 
apply, with such modifications as will be obvi- 
ous, to a detachment of any strength whatever. 

MARCHES 

are of three kinds : 

1. Tactical marches, or those made within 
range of the enemy's cannon, or, at least, within 
his actual view. 'These have nothing to do with 
the present subject, but belong to that of the 
Tactics of Battle. 

2. Ordinary Route marches, where the 
marching corps is beyond the enemy's reach ; 
and in which, therefore, no precautions need 
be used against him. 

3. Those in which the marching corps is, or 
may be, so far as is known, within the enemy's 
reach. It is these last, which have usually some 
strategic object, in view, and may therefore be 
called Strategic marches, that will be the kind 
treated of in the present work. 

We will consider the subject under the fol- 
lowing heads : — Preliminary Dispositons, Or- 
der of March, Columns of March, Conduct 
of the March, Advance Guards, Patrols, 
Rear Guards, and Trains. 



MARCHES PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS. 

I. PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS. 

1. Before moving, the General Commanding 
should satisfy himself that he is sufficiently pro- 
vided with reliable guides, and with maps of the 
country through which he is to march, as full 
and accurate as can be obtained. He should 
have the best information he can procure with 
respect to the resources of the country, and the 
particular localities where subsistence and for- 
age will be most certainly found ; and, what is 
the most important of all, the position,-number, 
and condition of the enemy's forces. This infor- 
mation will necessarily have a controlling influ- 
ence upon the direction of the march. 

2. He must also satisfy himself by actual per- 
sonal inspection, or by that of his staff officers, 
that he has a sufficient amount of ammunition, 
subsistence, hospital stores, and other necessary 
supplies, as well as sufficient means of transport- 
ation for the march he is about to make. 

3. The activity, mobility, efficiency, and offen- 
sive power of an army is usually in inverse ratio 
to the number of its wheel carriages. The Gen- 
eral Commanding, therefore, should take meas- 
ures to reduce this number to the lowest possi- 
ble minimum, especially when rapid marching is 
required. 



6 FIELD SEKVICE IN WAR. 

The means of effecting this reduction will be 
explained hereafter, in the Notes on Logistics. 

4. The proportion of artillery to infantry 
should not generally be less than two guns for 
every thousand men. But when this propor- 
tion will probably not be wanted, or cannot be 
used, as where the march is to be through a, 
densely wooded country, we may effect a great 
reduction in our impedimenta, by taking with 
us one gun only for each thousand men, as was 
done by Sherman, in his march from Atlanta to 
Savannah. 

5. In field operations, the value of cavalry con- 
sists chiefly in its celerity of movement. Though 
in a long strategic march, a certain amount of 
supply and baggage trains may be indispensable, 
in any special expedition in which rapid march- 
ing will be required, no wheel carriages other 
than those of horse artillery, and ambulances, 
should be allowed to accompany it. Its supply 
train should consist in such case, of pack animals 
exclusively. 

6. In an an offensive march through the ene- 
my's country, the importance of the services 
that may be rendered by numerous masses of 
cavalry on the grand flanks of the army can 
scarcely be exaggerated. As it is there that cav- 



MAKCHES — ORDER OF MARCH. 7 

airy men are chiefly needed, they should not be 
absorbed by details for orderlies, couriers, &c. 
For these duties, mounted men and officers 
among the infantry should rather be sought for. 

7. In order that the troops may be kept ready 
for sudden contingencies of fighting, or of 
detached movement, the men should always 
have two days' rations in their haversacks, and 
one hundred rounds of ammunition in their 
boxes and on their persons; and every gun 
should have with it as many as two hundred 
rounds. 

8. When we are marching so near the enemy 
that an engagement may come on at any mo- 
ment, knapsacks and shelter tents had better be 
carried in the wagons, so that the men may be 
kept as fresh as possible. 

II. ORDER OF MARCH. 

1. When the corps marches in a single col- 
umn, the normal, or usual Order of March is 
as follows : 

(1.) The Advance Guard, (sometimes called 
the Vanguard.) 

(2.) The Main Body. 

(3.) The Reserve. *' 

(4.) The Reserve Artillery Trains. 



8 FIELD SERVICE IN WAK. 

(5.) General Supply and Baggage Trains. 
(6.) The Rear Guard. 

2. The Cavalry marches mostly behind the 
Reserve, or, sometimes, behind the Baggage 
Train ; but a detachment of this arm, of greater 
or less strength, is always in advance of the 
entire column. And the nature of the ground, 
combined with other circumstances, sometimes 
renders it prudent to place the greater part of 
the cavalry at the head of the column. 

3. The Artillery is placed in those parts of 
the column where it will be the safest from 
attack, and where, at the same time, it may be 
readily brought into action. Some guns should 
always march behind the leading infantry bat- 
talion, in order to be at hand to cover the for- 
mation in case of the enemy being suddenly 
met with. 

When the corps is marching on several roads, 
the train of reserve artillery should always fol- 
low the main or principal road. 

Artillery should never form the head or the 
rear of a column; but should always be covered 
on the side next the enemy by infantry or by 
cavalry, to protect it while coming into battery. 
Indeed, every battery, throughout the column, 
should have with it a support of infantry or of 



MAKCHES ORDER OF MARCH 9 

cavalry. An infantry support is usually prefer- 
able. 

4. In ordinary c&sespegimental ambulances and 
ammunition wagons should march directly behind 
their respective regiments ; but other regimen- 
tal trains behind the division, in the order of 
the regiments themselves. Brigade and division 
supply trains march behind their respective 
army corps. Regimental camp equipage should 
be carried on pack animals; which, when no sud- 
den fighting appears probable, may follow in 
rear of its respective regiments. 

5. Constant vigilance will be necessary to 
prevent the entrance of other vehicles into the 
column ; and a staff officer will have to be sent, 
from time to time, to inspect the column, and 
report any violation of the rules prescribed with 
respect to the trains. 

6. The march of a large body of cavalry 
raises an immense dust which may be seen at a 
great distance. Therefore, when it is important 
to conceal our march, the mass of the cavalry 
should be kept, when practicable, at some dis- 
tance from the main column, on the flank furthest 
from the enemy ; except, however, where this 
would prevent the cavalry from promptly 
rejoining the column in case of need. 



10 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

On the 29th of August, 1862, to induce Gen. 
Fitz John Porter to believe that he was in pre- 
sence of a superior force, and thus prevent him 
fromjoining,in compliance with orders, our other 
corps in the fierce battle then raging near Gaines- 
ville, the Confederate General Stuart kept par- 
ties of horsemen constantly employed in dragging 
brush down the road, thereby raising great 
clouds of dust; such as would be caused by 
heavy masses of cavalry. The ruse was suc- 
cessful ; and Gen. Porter's inaction lost us an 
important victory. 

7. In marching through a mountainous or 
thickly wooded country, the head and rear 
should always be of infantry, for the better pro- 
tection of the entire column ; infantry being the 
only arm that can fight on any kind of ground. 

8. When very near an enemy in force, all 
the troops should be ahead of all wagons, except 
such a number of ammunition wagons and 
ambulances as there will be immediate need of 
in case of an engagement. 

9. To prevent straggling, each brigade should 
have its rear guard, which should permit no one 
to fall behind, except staff officers and couriers. 

10. In retreating, the trains lead the march, 
and must have as many hours start as the safety 



MARCHES COLUMNS OF MARCH. 11 

of the column will allow; especially where a 
river or a defile is to be passed. 

In this case, the Advance Guard becomes the 
Eear Guard, and the Eear Guard the Advance 
Guard, and the cavalry and light guns should 
be next the enemy. 

III. COLUMNS OF MARCH. 

1. Supplies and baggage must never march 
on the side next the enemy, as this would 
expose them to capture. Their march must 
be covered either by troops or by some natural 
obstacle, as a wide and deep river, or a steep 
mountain ridge. 

2. No one of the three arms should march 
entirely isolated, from the rest They should be 
at all times ready to co-operate with each 
other. 

In the Italian campaign of 1796, the Austrian 
General Alvinzi marched with an army of 45,- 
000 men from the Tyrol, down both banks of 
the Adige, to attack Bonaparte, who was then 
at or near Verona, with a far inferior force. The 
mountain path followed by the Austrian infantry 
being considered impracticable for their artil- 
lery and cavalry, these latter arms marched 
together, on a separate road. The plateau of 



12 FIELD SERVICE Itf WAR. 

Rivoli was the first point at which the two col- 
umns could unite. This plateau was occupied 
by the French General Joubert with an incon- 
siderable force. On hearing, at two o'clock in 
the morning, of Alvinzi's approach, Bonaparte 
instantly hurried off with the few divisions he 
had at hand to Joubert's support. The whole 
of the Austrian infantry had debouched on the 
plain; but, though far superior in numbers to 
the French, it was easily held in check till 
Bonaparte's arrival, not having the support of 
its artillery and cavalry, which had not yet 
come up. When these at last approached, 
ascending by a narrow mountain road, they 
made the most desperate efforts to debouch on 
the plain and unite with their infantry, but 
were constantly driven back, with great loss, 
by the French artillery ; and the Austrian 
army was completely routed by a French force 
of half its numbers. 

There can scarcely ever be an absolute neces- 
sity for marching the three arms in separate 
columns. Napoleon remarked that it was a 
mistake to suppose that cavalry cannot pass 
wherever two infantry soldiers can march 
abreast. And as to artillery, it would be hard to 
find a more conclusive example than his own 



MAl^CHES — -COLUMNS OF MARCH. 13 

celebrated crossing of the Great St. Bernard in 
1800, in which his guns, laid in hollowed trunks 
of trees and dragged by the soldiers, were 
transported over mule-paths, through deep 
snows, and down steep icy precipices ; the 
ammunition being put -in cases and carried by 
mules. 

3. The Guard nearest the enemy, whether 
Advance, Flank, or Rear, should consist of all 
the three arms, in order to give it solidity, and 
enable it to make a stand till the arrival of the 
main body. 

4. In each column, its different corps should 
keep sufficiently closed to be able to unite vjith- 
out delay if the enemy should appear in force. 

In the Italian Campaign of 1799, the French, 
under General Macdonald, lost the battle of the 
Trebbia, from three of their six divisions being 
so far in rear as not to be able to arrive in 
time. The three divisions in front were conse- 
quently beaten by Suwarrow's superior num- 
bers, two days in succession. 

5. If the enemy be within striking distance, 
the march of a single column of any consid- 
erable depth on a single road would be highly 
dangerous. A vigorous attack on its centre 
would force it, and expose the two parts of the 



14 FIELD SERVICE 1ST WAR. 

column, thus broken in twain, to be beaten in 
detail. Again, the column could be easily 
overwhelmed by a sudden attack on its head 
or rear, before the different parts would have 
time to come up in support. 

It was thus that Marshal Ney lost the battle 
of Dennewitz in 1813. He was marching with 
50,000 men from Seyda to Juterbock, in one 
column, on a single road. Although 80,000 of 
the enemy were near him, and informed of his 
march by an action the day before, instead of 
keeping his column as much closed as possible, 
he allowed an interval of two hours between 
each of his three corps. On arriving at Den- 
newitz, Bertrand's corps, consisting of 15,000 
men only, which led, was attacked by 40,000 
Prussians, who were there waiting to receive 
them. It was three hours before the next corps, 
marching over a sandy plain, was able to get 
up in support, and still later before the third 
corps could arrive on the ground. As Ber- 
trand's corps had been completely routed, and 
as 40,000 Swedes and Russians had meanwhile 
joined the Prussians, nothing but the hardest 
fighting and Ney's heroic exertions saved the 
French army from total destruction. As it was, 
Ney was forced to fall back on the Elbe with 
the loss of 20 guns and 15,000 men. 



MAKCHES COLUMNS OF MARCH. 15 

The memorable defeat of the Austrians at 
Morgarten in Switzerland in 1315 was caused 
by their being attacked by a party of fifty 
Swiss in ambush on their left flank, while march- 
ing in a single column through along defile, 
between the foot of a steep mountain ridge and 
a lake. The Austrian cavalry, which was lead- 
ing, being thrown into disorder by the attack, 
rushed to the rear, trampling down its own 
infantry. 

It is evident that when an army is obliged to 
march in one column, on a single road, it should 
be ready at any moment, to wheel into a com- 
pact line ; that if the enemy be waiting to attack 
it in front, it should march in as close order as 
practicable ; and that, in neither case, should 
any gap be left between the different parts of 
the column. 

6. If the enemy be only in our front, and we 
are not compelled to follow a single road, the 
nearer we approach him, the greater is the 
number of columns into which the army should 
be divided, in order to facilitate rapid deploy- 
ments, and to keep all the parts within mutual 
supporting distance. 

7. Besides the dangers of such a march, it 
would often be impossible for an armymarch- 

2 



16 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

ing in a single column, on one road, to find sub- 
sistence enough for the troops, or forage for the 
great number of animals which necessarily 
accompany it. Each corps, then, of an army, 
and sometimes, even, each of its divisions, 
marches on a separate road; but so disposed as 
to be able to form line of battle either by itself, 
or together with the other corps. The distance 
between the columns should be such that they 
can all unite in time. They should all have a 
common Advance Guard, marching on the prin- 
cipal road, and strong enough for vigorous action, 
and a common Reserve ; besides an Advance 
Guard and a Eeserve for each column. 

In September, 1862, General McClellan 
marched his army from Washington in quest of 
the enemy on five parallel routes ; his right, by 
Leesboro and Brookville to Newmarket ; his 
centre, on roads leading directly from Washing- 
ton to Frederick ; and his left, by roads near the 
Potomac. He was thus covering both Wash- 
ington and Baltimore, securing both his flanks 
from being turned, and ready at the same time, 
to concentrate promptly at any point in his 
front. If he had marched his army on any one 
road, the length of his column, with its trains, 
would have been fifty miles, one or both of his 



MARCHES — COLUMNS OF MARCH. 17 

flanks would have been left uncovered, and an 
attack on his army at his head would inevitably 
have crushed it in detail. 

8. A well disciplined force, of 15,000 or 20,- 
000 men, properly commanded, will usually be 
able, by rapid intrenching, to hold its ground 
against even a largely superior force for two or 
three hours ; and if in a strong position, for 
half a day, or even longer. Columns, therefore, 
of this strength, may safely march on parallel 
roads eight or ten miles apart. 

At the battle of Friedland, Lannes' corps of 
26,000 men, in a good position, skilfully com- 
manded, and fighting bravely, held its ground 
against 75,000 Russians from daylight until 
noon; when Napoleon arrived with reinforce- 
ments. 

But if a column of more than 20,000 men be 
marched on a single road, and the head of the 
column be attacked, it will usually be impossi- 
ble for the rear to come up in time to support 
the front; as, to get into position, its march 
must diverge considerably to the right or left, 
and the troops will be too much fagged by their 
long march to act with vigor immediately on 
arriving. 



18 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

9. Columns may sometimes safely march at a 
still greater distance from each other than half 
a day's or even one day's march ; as where 
the enemy's masses are known to be so distant 
or so scattered, that they cannot make a con- 
centrated attack on either of our columns until 
it can be joined by the others. All that is re- 
quired is that we be able to concentrate before 
the enemy can attack us with an equal or supe- 
rior force. 

10. Again, convergent marches may be com- 
paratively safe, even when the columns are not 
within supporting distance ; because every day 
diminishes the danger by diminishing the dis- 
tance between them. But in divergent marches^ 
the contrary is obviously the case. 

11. Not only should the ground between the 
columns be kept constantly scouted, but we 
should always, by means of flank detachments 
and patrols of light troops, occupy a space around 
the outer columns of at least one day's march, 
in order that we may know of the enemy's po- 
sition and movements in time. 

12. As the columns should be at all times 
ready to unite, they should have no insur- 
mountable obstacle between them. 



MARCHES — COLUMNS OF MARCH. 19 

In the Italian campaign of 1796, the Austrian 
army under Wurmser was destroyed by Bona- 
parte, with a far inferior force, in consequence 
of two of its principal columns being separated 
by the Lago di Garda. 

From a similar cause, in December, 1800, the 
Austrian army under the Archduke John, 
marching in three columns through an exten- 
sive forest, was routed by the French under Mo- 
reau at Hohenlinden. 

So, in 1813, Marshal Macdonald having sent 
two divisions to capture the little town of 
Hirschberg, on the river Bober, in Silesia, and 
having ordered one division to march by one 
bank of the river, and the other by the oppo- 
site bank, the Prussians fell upon one of the 
divisions, consisting of 6,000 men, during its 
march, and destroyed or captured the whole of 
it, in full view of the other division, which 
could give it no assistance. 

13. But the danger of a march in separate 
columns, with obstacles between them, will obvi- 
ously be much less where there are frequent 
cross roads between their respective routes ; 
and, in all marches in separate columns, there 
should be a constant communication between 
2* 



20 FIELD SERVICE IIST WAR. 

them by mounted patrols, which examine the 
intermediate country. 

14. What has been said in regard to the 
advantages of a march in separate columns 
must be taken with this qualification, that, owing 
to unforeseen contingencies, or to the want of 
promptness, or of intelligence on the part of 
the column commanders, or to their ignorance 
of the plans of the General Commanding, 
important combinations often fail ; and that 
there is especial danger of this when the coun- 
try through which we are marching is not well 
known. These dangers may sometimes exist 
in such a degree as to even more than counter- 
balance those of marching in one column on a 
single road. 

15. The Orders of March should specify : 
(1). The number of columns, and their 

respective commanders, and by what road each 
is to march. 

(2). The strength and composition of each 
column, as also of the general Advance, Flank, 
and Rear Guards, and their respective com- 
manders. 

(3 J. The hour at which each column is to 
move. Not only the time of marching, but the 
time of arrival at the halting place of each 



MARCHES ORDERS OF MARCH. .21 

column for the night should usually be specified. 
When the march is to execute a definite strat- 
egic object, this will be indispensable ; and for 
the slightest departure from the programme in 
this respect, the column commander should be 
held to a strict account. But if the column 
commanders arrive with their commands at the 
hour and place appointed, they should have full 
liberty as to the rest ; for the exigencies of a 
inarch of a separate column cannot be foreseen ; 
and these may differ as to each column. 

(4). When, and from what point the Re- 
serve Train is to move, and under the escort of 
what detachment. 

(5). The chief measures of precaution to 
he taken on the march. 

(6). Where the General Commanding is to 
be found during the march. 

(7). Everything that the circumstances 
require to be provided for ; including the gen- 
eral dispositions to be made on meeting the 
enemy. 

16. The Orders of March should not he pub- 
lished to the troops ; else, they might easily 
get to the enemy through spies, deserters or 
prisoners ; but only communicated to the corps, 
division, and brigade commanders. 



22 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

17. During the march, every column com- 
mander should know, 

(1). The object in view ; 

(2). What commanders are next to him on 
either flank, or in front and in rear ; 

(3). Who is to reinforce him if attacked; and 

(4). On what point he is to fall back, if 
driven by the enemy. 

18. The column commanders should report, 
daily, or from time to time, according to cir- 
cumstances, not only the appearance of the 
enemy and particular events, but also their 
arrival at halting places, and the distance of 
these from known points on the road. 

These, and all other military reports in the 
field, should be numbered consecutively, so that 
it may be known at a glance, on the receipt of 
one report, if any preceding one has miscarried. 

19. In a march by separate columns, the Gen- 
eral Commanding should be with that one 
which is expected to be the first to come in con- 
tact with the enemy ; in order that, on meeting 
him, no time may be lost in making the proper 
dispositions for battle. 

IV. CONDUCT OF THE MARCH. 

1. The column commander should keep him- 
self habitually at the head of his column; though, 



MARCHES — CONDUCT OF THE MARCH. 23 

when the movements of the enemy are uncer- 
tain, his presence may sometimes be more neces- 
sary at some other point. 

The repeated hesitations, delays, and failures 
of the Army of the Potomac in 1863, after the 
battle of Gettysburg, appear to have been 
caused mainly by our corps commanders not 
going personally to the front, and content- 
ing themselves with mere reports of the enemy 
being in force at particular points. 

In all cases, on the least sign of an enemy, 
the chief of the leading division should instantly 
repair to the threatened point. 

2. A detachment of pioneers should always 
precede the Advance Guard, in order to remove 
obstructions, repair the roads and bridges, and 
make additional passages in bad places, and thus 
prevent the column, so far as as possible, from 
being delayed. 

3. In coming into position for battle in the 
enemy's immediate presence, it is obvious that 
not a moment must be lost unnecessarily. In 
such case, therefore, the column will march, 
when practicable, directly to the point assigned 
it, cutting off all angles, and leaving the high- 
way, whenever the more direct course will be 
across fields and enclosures. For this purpose, 



24 FIELD SERVICE IN WAB. 

a mounted detachment of pioneers, in advance, 
will render important service in moving rapidly 
to let down fences, fill up ditches, &c. 

4. In the column, the three arms should be 
some two hundred paces apart, so that each one 
may have perfect freedom of movement on the 
enemy making his appearance. 

5. -The march should be usually in open col- 
umn ; that is, all the subdivisions should keep 
at full wheeling distance from each other. 
For 

(1). A close column, or a column at half 
distance, cannot form in line of battle to a flank 
without a very great loss of time. A march in 
close column, moreover, is too crowded and 
exhausting to be long continued. 

(2). A column at full distance, if the enemy 
should appear on either flank, could instantly 
form in line of battle to oppose him by a mere 
simultaneous wheel of its subdivisions. 

6. But when there is no danger of an attack 
in flank, and it is expected to meet the enemy 
in front, the column should march closed to half 
distance, or even in mass, according as such 
meeting is more or less probable ; in order that 
it may be ready to deploy on its head into line 
of battle in the shortest possible time. 



MARCHES CONDUCT OF THE MARCH. 25 

7. A considerable corps cannot make, on the 
average, for any great length of time, more 
than ten or twelve miles a day. In smaller 
numbers, troops may average fifteen or twenty 
miles a day. For two or three days only 
in succession, with good roads, may thirty 
miles a day be relied on. If the roads [be 
mountainous, or otherwise difficult, these figures 
must obviously be reduced in proportion. 

Troops inured to marching can accomplish far 
more than those who are not. Napoleon's vet- 
erans, accustomed to forced marches, could 
march forty-five miles in one day, in case of 
need. Perhaps the most extraordinary forced 
march ever made was that by General Priant's 
division, of one hundred and eight miles in for- 
ty-eight hours, to take part in the battle of 
Austerlitz. It arrived on the ground during 
the night before the battle, and nevertheless dis- 
tinguished itself the next day by its heroic 
resistance against fearful odds. 

8. A night mar chis always slow, fatiguing, and 
dangerous, and to cavalry, paralysing. The col- 
umn should arrive at its halting place, when 
practicable, two hours before dark ; so as to 
allow the men time to make themselves com- 
fortable for the night, and be better able to act 



26 FIELD SERVICE IN WAK. 

vigorously, in case of need, on the morrow. 
Even veterans cannot be exposed to a night 
march in bad weather with impunity. Such 
exposure always places more or less of them on 
the sick list, especially at the beginning of a 
march ; and in the case of raw troops, the loss 
of effective strength caused by it is always con- 
siderable. 

9. Cavalry, marching through woods, must 
always have its advance dismounted, in order to 
feel for the enemy ; else it will be liable to be 
ambuscaded in a most dangerous position. 

In September, 1863, General J.W.Davidson's 
division was advancing on Little Eock, on the 
south side of Arkansas River. In marching 
through the forest, the 10th Illinois Cavalry was 
at the head of the column. Its advance, of two 
companies, was mounted, like the rest. Sud- 
denly a murderous fire in flank led to a panic, 
(for cavalry cannot fight or manoeuvre in a forest) 
which spread to the rear, causing the flight of 
the whole regiment. Though it was afterwards 
rallied by the personal exertions of General 
Davidson, it was not without the loss of two 
guns and of a considerable number of men. 
This would not have happened, if the advance 
had been marching dismounted, as skirmishers. 



MARCHES CONDUCT OF THE MARCH. 27 

10. "Whenever the column halts, unless it be 
only for a few minutes' rest, when its patrols 
may suffice to give the alarm, the forces must 
be so disposed as to be ready to repel any sud- 
den attack on the troops or on the trains. 

At every halt, the animals must be allowed to 
make the most of their time in pasturing ; and 
whenever the halt is to be for several hours, 
parties should be sent out to procure forage. 

11. A column should never halt in front of a 
defile, but always beyond it ; else the enemy 
may have time to concentrate a force to dispute 
its passage. And a defile should be passed as 
rapidly as possible ; as troops attacked in one 
are always in great danger. 

12. For obvious reasons, halts in or near 
towns or villages should be avoided as much a& 
possible ; especially where the troops are not in 
a state of high discipline ; and we should also 
avoid passing through or near them on the 
march. 

13. To prevent exhaustion of the men, the 
step should never he lengthened m order to pre- 
serve distances. To effect this, the leading bat- 
talion should rather step short. 

If a battalion cannot keep up, word should 
be sent to the head of the column, that the step 
3 



28 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

may be shortened. Even a company must not 
66 step out/' to keep up with the rest of the bat- 
talion ; though this does not apply to portions 
of a company, which never must be separated. 

There should always be a staff officer at the 
rear of the column, to bring or send word when 
the rear is delayed, or cannot keep up. 

14. The infantry should habitually keep on 
one side of the road, in order to leave room for 
cavalry, guns, and vehicles to pass. 

15. In passing muddy spots or streams, the 
men must not be allowed to pick their way over, 
even if they have to be in water up to their 
middle ; but must be made to march in the 
same order as in a good road. Experience has 
shown that, unless all the men push straight 
through, there will be great loss of time. 
When the column is a very small one, this 
precaution is not so important; as the 
delay caused would, in that case, be trifling. 

16. If the march of a column must be imme- 
diately reversed in order to get into battle, it 
must be done by a simple facing about; and 
not by a countermarch, which would cause an 
unnecessary loss of time. 

At the battle of Shiloh, Gen. Lew Wallace's 
division was only five miles in rear of our right, 



MAKCHES ADVANCE GUARD. 29 

where the fight was raging fiercest, and where 
it was sorely needed. It had been ordered up 
early in the morning ; but, from mistaking the 
road, it was marching in the wrong direction 
until one o'clock, p. m., when it was set right. 
Instead of simply facing the column about, its 
commander ordered a countermarch ; which 
caused such a loss of time that the divi- 
sion did not arrive on the ground till 7 o'clock, 
when its services were no longer needed. 

17. But, in reversing the column to march 
into battle, the troops, except the rear guard, 
must all pass in front of the trains ; and the 
ammunition wagons must be placed in advance 
of all the others. 

V. ADVANCE GUARD. 

1. The functions of an Advance Guard are 
four fold : 

(1). To serve as a screen for our army and 
its movements. 

(2). To observe the enemy and his dispo- 
sitions. 

(3). Defensively ; To protect the main 
body from attack until it has had time to form 
and complete its line of battle ; and sometimes, 



30 FIELD SERVICE IX WAR. 

(4). Offensively ; To look for the enemy, 
and having found him, to initiate the battle and 
to sustain it until the arrival of the main body. 

2. As the two latter are its most important 
functions, it follows that, while the main body 
must be near enough for support, there should 
nevertheless, be distance enough between the 
two to give the main body time to take up a 
position for hattlehefore the Advance Guard can 
be driven back upon it. The time required for 
this depends upon several circumstances ; as 
the depth of the columns, the intervals between 
them, and the nature and condition of the 
roads. For a single small detachment 500 
yards might be sufficient : while, for a large 
army, ten or twelve miles, or a half day's march, 
might be required. A column a mile long could 
form to the front in fifteen minutes, or less, and 
its Advance Guard might safely precede it a 
mile or more. 

The Advance Guard of a considerable army 
should therefore usually be a few miles, but not 
exceeding half a day's march, in advance of 
the main body. 

3. This distance will not fre too great if 
regard be had only to the defensive function of 
the Advance Guard, or to the probability of the 



MARCHES — ADVANCE GUARD. 31 

marching corps being itself attacked in front 
during the march. But where the marching 
corps is engaged in an offensive operation, and 
is about to strike a vigorous blov: at an enemy 
massed in great force, the rule must be modi- 
fied. In that case, the great military principle 
of concentration will govern. 

For example, at Hohenlinden, in December, 
1800; 

Fig. 1. 

| -<^ 6 MILES. — — ~ " 

Latour's Vanguard. Latour's Main Body. 

1 1 LL 1 1 



<~ 



Austrian Centre Column. 



II II I I 



<- 



Austrian Left Column. 



The vanguard of Latour's column of 25,000 
men debouched from the forest in advance of 
the rest of the Austrian army, and made a pow- 
erful attack on the French left wing ; and would 
have destroyed it, had its main body, which 
was six miles behind, on a very boggy and dif- 
ficult road, been able to arrive in time to sup- 
port it. The delay gave the French time to 
reinforce their left, and the Austrians were ter- 
ribly defeated. 

4. Indeed, whenever it is desired to strike a 
3* 



dZ FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

sudden and powerful blow, with our whole 
force, it will be best to march without any Ad- 
vance Guard at all ; for, in that case, the use 
of one would notify the enemy of our approach, 
and thus tend to defeat our object. 

5. The Advance Guard is liable, at any time, 
to be engaged with an equal or a superior 
force ; or may have to operate offensively in 
order to mask an attack of the main body on 
the enemy's flank. It should therefore be com- 
posed of all the three arms, so as to be able to 
act effectively on all kinds of ground ; and 
should consist, according to circumstances, of 
from one-fifth to one-third of the entire force. 
For instance, if the country be broken, offering 
everywhere strong positions for defence, one- 
fifth might suffice ; in the contrary case, one- 
third might not be too large. 

In an open country, the proportion of cav- 
alry should be large. In a broken country, there 
should be a great preponderance of infantry. 

6. In order to have the earliest possible 
notice of the enemy's appearance, and to search 
all the ground in dangerous proximity, the 
Advance Guard keeps out certain small detach- 
ments. These are 

(1). The Advance ; 



MARCHES ADVANCE GUARD. 33 

(2). Two Flank Detachments ; thrown 
out one on each flank, to the distance of several 
hundred yards ; or much further, if circum- 
stances require it. 

(3). A Rear Detachment, as a rear guard, 

These detachments should amount, together, 

to not over one-half of the Advance Guard ; 

leaving its main body to constitute one-half of 

its total strength. 

7. The Advance Detachment should be of 
cavalry when the ground permits ; as this arm 
can safely keep at a much greater distance in 
front than infantry, and can carry back infor- 
mation much more rapidly. But in a broken, 
and especially in a wooded country, it is dan- 
gerous to have cavalry at the head, as its repulse 
would be apt to throw the troops behind it into 
confusion. This remark, however, does not 
apply to a few horsemen. 

In passing through an extensive forest, in- 
fantry patrols, also, replace those of cavalry. 

8. The Advance Detachment, according to 
circumstances, may march half a mile, or even 
a mile ahead of the main body of the Advance 
Guard. From this detachment a still smaller 
one is usually thrown forward a few hundred 
paces; and this, again, is preceded, one hundred 



34 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

paces in advance, by an apex, consisting of 
three mounted men, or of a staff officer, with a 
few horsemen. 

9. The Flank Detachfnents throw out from 
their flanks a few men c&lle&jlanJcers, who patrol 
outside of their detachments at the distance of 
two hundred yards or more, according to the 
ground. 

10. The Advance and Flank Detachments 
must keep at such distances from the main body 
of the Advance Guard, as to prevent the enemy's 
approach, unperceived, in front or in flank ; and at 
the same time, be within supporting distance of 
each other. 

11. On approaching the enemy, the different 
parts of the Advance Guard close in to their 
main body ; so as to be ready to debouch in 
full force, with the support of cavalry and artil- 
lery. 

12. Not only the Advance Guard, but the 
main body of the "marching force has out also 
its Advance, Flank, and Eear Detachments ; 
except when the column has so little depth, and 
the Advance, Guard is near to it that these pre- 
cautions are unnecessary for its safety. 



MARCHES— DUTIES OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 35 
VI. DUTIES OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 

1. It must use every precaution to prevent 
the enemy's gaining information of our force 
or of our movements. 

2. When opportunity offers, it should perform 
the duty of a partisan corps, in keeping the 
enemy constantly occupied, and in harassing 
him by frequent alarms ; so as to make him use 
fatiguing precautions to secure his flanks and 
rear, while our own main force is kept fresh. 

3. For its camps, it must choose positions 
from which it can watch the enemy, and still be 
in concealment, and not exposed to a sudden 
attack in front or flank. 

4. The Advance and Flank Detachments 
must sharply observe all that occurs around 
them. 

5. The strictest order is required, especially 
in the Advance Detachment. Nothing should 
be allowed which might divert their attention 
from watching, or which might make their 
approach known to the enemy. No fire-arm 
should be discharged, except in case of absolute 
necessity. 

6. The Advance sends forward scouts to 
examine defiles ; which should be so occupied 
by detachments of the Advance Guard as to 
secure them until the main column gets up. 



36 FIELD SEKVICE IN WAR. 

When the Advance has passed a bridge or 
other defile, it sends forward cavalry patrols to 
a considerable distance in front, before the 
main body of the Advance Guard begins to 
enter it ; for a defile is a most dangerous place 
for a corps to be attacked in* 

But when the ground in front of the defile is 
wooded, or rugged and mountainous, it is 
infantry patrols that must be sent out. Some 
infantry, therefore, should always be near the 
head of a column. These patrols ascend the 
neighboring heights, and remain there watching, 
until relieved by patrols from the Rear Detach- 
ment of the Advance Guard. The cavalry, and 
the train of the main column halt in rear of 
the defile until it has been occupied. 

7. If the Advance Detachment come to a 
bridge that has been burned or made impassa- 
ble, or to an unfordable stream, it must imme- 
diately send back to report the fact, so that the 
pontoons may be brought up without delay. 

8. Whenever the Advance" Guard halts, the 
men at the apex should ascend any height that 
may be within four or five hundred yards. In 
approaching the top, the leading man, with his 
cap off, creeps cautiously up till he can look 
over it. 

*As to the Defence of Defiles, see " Special Operations of War." 



MARCHES DUTIES OF THE ADVANCE GUARD. 37 

9. Woods, when it is practicable, should be 
ridden round by horse before the main body of 
the Advance Guard passes through them. If 
the wood be too extensive for this, it should be 
examined for two hundred paces or more on 
each side of the road. 

10. All doubtful ground must be searched by 
the leading or flank detachments before any 
large body comes within range of it. 

On meeting" tKe enemy. 

11. Whenever the enemy is reported in sight, 
the commander of the Advance Guard instantly 
goes to reconnoitre his position and numbers. 

12. If the Advance Guard be compelled to 
fall back before a superior force, it should not 
retreat directly on the main corps ; for this 
might throw it into confusion, or at least disturb 
its formation. It should rather take up a posi- 
tion that will both unmask the main corps, and 
enable the Advance Guard itself to threaten the 
advancing enemy in flank. 

13. But it should always resist long enough 
to allow the main corps to come up, or to make 
its dispositions for battle. For this purpose, it 
should at once take up a strong position, and 
hold it obstinately. If this is impracticable, it 



38 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

should retire as slowly as possible ; seizing 
every opportunity of checking the enemy's 
advance. 

14. On meeting the enemy suddenly, unless 
he be evidently in too great force, the Advance 
Guard should attack him immediately. By so 
doing, we should have all the chances in our 
favor, even against superior numbers ; as it may 
be reasonably presumed that he was no more 
aware of our approach than we were of his. 

15. So, even if the enemy be met in superior 
force, if he be not formed for battle, the Advance 
Guard should at once charge impetuously, so as 
to confuse him and hinder his formation. 

The noble Theban, Pelopidas, suddenly fell in 
with a Spartan force of double his numbers. 
One of his men rushed up, crying out '" We have 
fallen into the midst of the enemy!" "Say, 
father," said Pelopidas, a the enemy has fallen 
into the midst of nsl" He immediately attacked 
and routed them; and it was this defeat which 
first broke the Spartan prestige of invincibility. 

16. For the Advance Detachment, on meeting 
the enemy, the most prudent course is to deploy 
a part of it as skirmishers, keeping the rest in 
reserve. In broken ground, the skirmishers 
may be kept far ahead, and the reserve held 



MARCHES PATROLS. 3 9 

back. As the ground opens, concentrate. If 
there are guns at hand, plant them so as to 
sweep the approaches. In this order the detach- 
ment may fall back on its main body. 

17. If ' reconnoitering parties of hostile cav- 
alry make their appearance, they should be 
pursued at once, and, if possible, captured or 
destroyed. If, from their numbers, their object 
appears to be to attack or to harass the column, 
they should be dispersed immediately. To 
effect this, promptly unlimber a few guns, and 
play upon them with canister or with shell,, 
according to their distance. 

18. On approaching a stream, if there be a, 
hostile force on the other side, lose no time in, 
bringing up some guns of suitable calibre, and 
in planting them so as to cover the crossing, in 
case it should be opposed.* 

VII. FLANK AND OTHER PATROLS. 

1. Patrols should be kept out on the flanks of 
the *main column ; especially on that side on 
which the enemy is supposed to be. These 
Patrols have, likewise, each its advance party, 
whenever they are beyond supporting distance 
irom the column. 

*As to the Passage of Rivers See " Special Operations of 
War." 

4 



40 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

2. These Patrols always keep out two or 
more pair oilers at some distance beyond their 
flanks. They keep up with the head of the 
main column, and watch all lateral defiles and 
woods by which it may be attacked, till the col- 
umn is beyond danger. 

3. It is the duty of these and of all Patrols, 
(which should be of cavalry when the ground 
permits), 

(1). To keep as much scattered as possible. 

(2). If attacked, to check the enemy's 
advance as long as possible ; retiring fighting, 
on their supports. 

(3). On a height being seen, to approach 
the top to look over it with the same precautions 
that are observed by the apex of the Advance 
Guard, as already explained. 

(4). Never to fire on seeing the enemy, 
unless driven in, and there be no time to send 
a report ; for the enemy may not have seen 
them. They should retire silently. 

(5). To secure the column against sudden 
attack, by choosing commanding positions for 
observation whenever the column makes a halt. 
The Patrols halt in marching order, and facing 
outwards, so as to see in every direction at once. 

4. A cavalry patrol, or other cavalry can sel- 
dom honorably surrender, unless surrounded 



MARCHES REAR GUARD. 41 

by* a greatly superior force. If suddenly 
attacked, an instantaneous and determined 
charge through the enemy will usually result 
in the escape of the greater part, if not of 
the whole. 

VIII. REAR GUARD. 

1. Of a Rear Guard in a retreat, the task is 
very difficult; but its duties in such an emer- 
gency belong rather to the head of the Tactics 
of Combat. Its duties in an offensive march, 
which is the case now supposed, are compara- 
tively light and easy. They consist chiefly in 
covering the trains, and in bringing up strag- 
glers. 

2. It should keep flank patrols pushed out as 
far as is safe, in order to be warned in time of 
any appearance of a design to attack, or to cut it 
off. 

3. When threatened with an attack, it should 
be covered by a line of skirmishers ; supported, 
if the occasion require, by other arms ; which 
line, if driven in, should rally on the flanks, 
leaving the road clear for the action of our cav- 
alry, infantry or guns. 

4. To make the trains as safe as possible^ 
troops of the Rear Quard should march on both 

flanks of them, as well as in their rear. 



42 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

5. A Rear Guard of cavalry alone, separated 
from the column by the baggage, is exposed to 
destruction. A battalion of infantry, with some 
guns, is not^in so much danger; as it can keep 
the enemy at a distance by its fire, is not lia- 
ble, like cavalry, to be thrown in disorder among 
the trains, and can fight on any kind of ground. 

6. The Advance and Rear Guards should alter- 
nate at regular periods of one day or more, 
according to the depth of the column. The 
duties of a Rear Guard, encumbered with the 
charge of the wagons, are usually very irksome, 
and often laborious ; as, when the roads are bad? 
the men have to be constantly assisting in light- 
ening the wagons, and in drawing them out 
when mired. It should be observed, by the way, 
that the men of the Advance Guard are also 
employed, when needed, in helping the engineer 
troops to repair roads, rebuild bridges, and 
remove obstructions. 

IX. TRAINS 

Comprise all kinds of vehicles and pack ani- 
mals used in the transportation of baggage, 
supplies and munitions of war. Besides the 
ordinary trains there are Siege Trains, Pontoon 
Trains, and Trains of Reserve Artillery. 



MARCHES- — TKAIKS. 43 

1. Before commencing a dangerous march, or 
one that will require very rapid movements, all 
wagons, pack trains, and supplies of every de- 
scription, not absolutely indispensable, should 
be sent back to our base, or to some secure 
depot. 

2. Very long trains are to be avoided. They 
require a large number of troops to guard 
them, are easily surprised, and, if attacked, can 
rarely be effectually defended. They are always 
attended with more or less confusion, and their 
proper organization requires a vast deal of time 
and labor. 

3. The trains belonging to a brigade are 
usually consolidated, and march in one body 
behind their brigade. 

4. In a single column, consisting of several 
brigades, all the brigade trains may be united, 
and march together. In this case, the safest 
place will be in the rear part of the whole col- 
umn, in front of the Kear Guard. 

5. When the army is marching in several col- 
umns, all the trains should be united in one, 
(but leaving with their respective brigades those 
carrying articles for immediate use,) and placed 

in rear of that column which is most remote 

4* 



44 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

from the enemy ; or else, on a separate road by 
themselves, on the flank furthest from the enemy. 

6. If it is expected to meet the enemy, and 
both flanks of the array are exposed, keep all the 
trains not of urgent necessity in rear of the 
central column, at the distance of half a day's 
march behind it, so as not to impede a retreat ; 
during which the trains should always keep at 
this distance ahead. 

7. When an object of urgent necessity is at 
stake, in order to accelerate the march, the 
trains may be sent by another route, or even be 
abandoned altogether. 

8. When the roads are very bad and rapid 
marching is important, as, in pursuit of a beaten 
enemy, we may accelerate the march by using 
extra teams for our artillery and ammunition 
carriages. 

9. A train has always an escort in front, or in 
rear of it, or both, according to circumstances ; 
and sometimes one on the flank towards the 
enemy; from which flank patrollers are kept 
out. 

10. It is of the utmost importance, in order 
to prevent mistakes and confusion, which might 
be fatal in case of a rapid retreat, and also that 
each corps may rely on having its necessary 



MARCHES TRAINS. 45 

supplies always on hand, that the most minute 
and detailed orders should be given and obeyed 
'in relation to the march of the trains. 

11. Trains are divided into three classes : 
(1). Those which may be needed during 
the march] comprising ambulances for the 
wounded, with surgical instruments and appli- 
ances, cooking utensils, ammunition wagons, 
spare artillery carriages, and pontoon wagons, 
when expected to be used. 

These should be behind their respective bri- 
gades or regiments. 

(2), Supplies and articles needed in camp, 
as, provisions and forage for immediate distri- 
bution, papers and records, camp equipage and 
intrenching tools, money, medicines, field forges, 
artillery wagons, staff baggage wagons, pack 
animals of field and company officers, sutlers' 
wagons. 

These march behind the division, or the 
army corps to which they belong, between the 
main body and the rear guard of their re- 
spective columns. 

(3). Supplies for which there is no present 
necessity ; as, general provision wagons and for- 
age, hospital stores and equipments, ambu- 
lances for the sick, pontoon trains, when not 



46 FIELD SEKYICE IN WAR. 

expected to be used, and the train of reserve 
artillery. 

All these march on the principal route, or in 
rear of the principal column. 

When a battle is expected, the third class 
trains, and such part of the second class trains 
as can be spared, should keep at half a day's 
march behind the main body. 

12. Wagons containing loose powder should 
march by themselves. No other articles should 
ever be placed on them. They should always 
be the furthest from the enemy, to secure them 
from capture and explosion by his missiles. 

13. Large trains are divided into sections of 
one hundred wagons each, marching at one- 
third of a mile apart. The head of each sec- 
tion should halt whenever it is necessary to 
enable the rear to close up. 

14. Trains should always keep on the right of 
the road, so as to afford a free passage by them 
for troops in case of emergency. In a forced 
march to battle, all trains that may hinder the 
march of troops must be immediately stopped, 
turned out of the road, and either sent at once 
to the rear, or parked facing to the rear, ready 
to move off at a moment's warning, according 
to circumstances. 



MARCHES — TRAINS. 47 

15. Most of the employees connected with 
transportation trains in our service, have hith- 
erto been civilians hired by the Quartermaster's 
Department. It would be a great improvement 
to require them all to be enlisted soldiers, and 
to give to this branch of the service a military 
organization, like the others. For 

(1). By the introduction of strict military 
discipline and responsibility, the prompt and 
complete execution of all orders would be en- 
sured. This would prevent, in great measure, 
those disappointments and delays whiclrso often 
cause the failure of the best planned military 
movements ; to say nothing of those dangerous 
panics which citizen teamsters and drivers are 
liable to create during a battle. 

At the battle of Malvern Hill, in July, 1862, 
the hired teamsters of one of our batteries ran 
away in the dark with their teams. The guns 
and carriages would have been lost, but for the 
extraordinary exertions of the First Connecti- 
cut Foot Artillery, which succeeded in dragging 
them away by hand some three miles over 
almost impracticable roads. 

(2). By means of wagon-train drills, as now 
used in the French army, in which the drivers 
and their teams are practised in all the opera- 



48 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

tions and movements that may become neces- 
sary in the field ; the duties of this branch of 
the service would be performed with much 
greater skill and efficiency. 

(3). These enlisted men would often prove 
a valuable reinforcement in garrison or in the 
field. At the battle of Nashville, in December, 
1864, our inner line of works, covering the city 
of Nashville, was held by a quasi-military organ- 
ization of 5000 men belonging to the Quarter- 
master Department, under the Chief Quarter- 
master of the Department of the Cumberland. 
(4). The expense to the government would 
be far less than under the present system. 

When Buonaparte was made First Consul, the 
French artillery drivers were hired citizens ; 
and from this cause, the artillery was unreliable 
and inefficient. Buonaparte immediately 
changed the sytemby making them all soldiers ; 
and the French artillery soon became the terror 
of Europe. 

16. Of the danger of disregarding established 
principles concerning the march of columns, 
every war has furnished more or less of exam- 
ples. Two will be cited from our late war of 
the Rebellion. 

In April, 1864, a column of 22,000 men, under 
General Banks, was marching upon Shreveport, 



MAKCHES — SABINE CROSS ROADS. 49 

Louisiana. The actual direction of the column 
appears to have been left to General Franklin, 
the next in command. The entire column was 
marching through a thick pine forest on a single 
road, too narrow, except in occasional open 
spots, to admit of the passage of two carriages 
abreast. The Advance Guard consisted of a 
cavalry force of 3,500 men. Following this came 
the cavalry supply and baggage train, over two 
miles long, loaded with ten days' rations and 
forage. The artillery was in front of the 
wagon train. Seven miles behind the cavalry 
marched the Thirteenth Corps, and some eight 
miles in rear of this was the Nineteenth Corps ; 
the entire column being about twenty four 
miles deep. 

On attempting to debouch upon some open 
ground near Sabine Cross Roads, the cav- 
alry was suddenly attacked by Confederate 
infantry, not only in front, but on each flank. 
Being in no condition to deploy or to fight, it 
was soon driven back upon its immense train ? 
which stood blocking up the road within less 
than a mile of the enemy. A reinforcement of 
two infantry brigades, at the -first alarm, had 
been sent forward from the Thirteenth Corps ; 
but arriving too late, and overborne by the 



50 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

mixed mass of rushing teams and fugitive 
horsemen, it was soon driven back with the rest. 
The entire Thirteenth Corps was unable to 
stem the torrent. The rout continued for 
twelve miles ; when the flying column came up 
with the Nineteenth Corps, which had taken up 
a strong position on some heights near the road. 
After opening its lines to allow the fugitive 
mass to pass through them, this corps stoutly 
held its ground, and was beginning even to act 
offensively, when the enemy withdrew under 
cover of the darkness. 

The accounts as to the extent of our loss are 
conflicting ; but it would appear to include, 
besides killed and wounded, that of the entire 
cavalry train, some two or three batteries, and 
twenty-five hundred prisoners. The Confede- 
rate force was about equal to our own. 

17. The errors that led to this disaster were 
as follows : 

(1.) Assuming that there was no other 
practicable route tha*n this single road through 
a dense forest in the heart of the enemy's coun- 
try, the extreme danger of such a march by a 
large force should have prompted such an order 
of march as would be most conducive to its 
safety in case of a sudden attack. But the dif- 



MARCHES — SABINE CROSS ROADS. 51 

ferent parts of the column were too distant 
from each other for mutual effective support. 
The rear was a whole day's march from the front. 

(2). On such a road, it was a gross viola- 
tion of military rules and of common sense, to 
place at the head of the column a large cavalry 
force, which, if suddenly attacked, could neither 
deploy nor fight, nor in fact, do anything else 
but fall back, and thus throw every thing 
behind it into confusion. The action of cavalry 
being necessarily paralysed by a march through 
a forest, its proper place was in the rear of the 
entire column, where, if it could do no good, it 
could at least do no harm. A few mounted 
orderlies could have been left without danger 
near the head of the column, to carry informa- 
tion and orders. 

If the Advance Guard had been of infantry, 
carefully feeling the ground by skirmishers in 
front and on both flanks, the main body, no 
matter how sudden the attack, would have been 
in a condition to resist it. The enemy's attack 
could be only with infantry, with which our own 
infantry would have engaged at least on equal 
terms, until by obstinate fighting and by man- 
oeuvring, we should compel him to withdraw. 
5 



52 FIELD SERVICE IK WAR. 

(3). The artillery of the Advance Guard 
being wedged in between the cavalry and the 
wagon train, it is no wonder that it was all cap- 
tured. In a long column, especially on a road 
through a forest, two or three guns should be 
near the head of the column ; but the rest should 
be scattered, at intervals, throughout the column. 
This would protect them from capture, while 
they would be at hand for effective use when- 
ever the ground would permit, and at whatever 
point the attack might be made. 

(4). It w^as another gross violation of es- 
tablished principles to allow a baggage train to 
march in front of the main column. 

For, First, It was thereby exposed to capture. 

Secondly, In case of the cavalry advance 
being driven back, by its blocking of the road, 
it must inevitably convert what might have 
been an orderly[re treat into panic, disorganiza- 
tion and confusion. 

Thirdly, In such a position, it virtually con- 
stituted an insurmountable obstacle, cutting off 
the Advance Guard from all effective support 
from the main column. 

Finally, The cavalry needed no wagon train 
at all. Its supplies and baggage could have 
been packed on mules. And, apart from this, 



MAKCHES — THE GUKTOWN KOUT. 53 

its train, of whatever consisting, was not needed 
at the head of the column at all. The troopers 
could easily have carried with them in their 
haversacks three or four days' rations, and nose- 
bags containing one day's forage. Squads of men 
could have been daily sent back for more ; or 
else, a certain number of forage mules could 
have been driven up every night to refill the 
nose-bags. 

(5). Half the wagons, it is said, were filled 
with]trunks, chairs, valises, and other cumber- 
some baggage. If this be true, the officer~who 
permitted so outrageous an abuse was clearly 
unfit to be entrusted with any command in time 
of war. 

18. Another and most disgraceful instance is 
the rout of a column of 5,000 infantry, some 
3,500 cavalry, and four batteries, under General 
Sturges, by an equal Confederate force near 
Guntown, Mississippi, in June, 1864. The col- 
umn was marching on a single road, the cav- 
alry in front, unsupported by infantry, or (as 
would appear) by guns, the three infantry bri- 
gades being scattered along the road some eight 
miles in rear; and, as if this order of march 
was not dangerous enough, a train of two hun- 
dred and fifty wagons was allowed to block the 



54 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

road in rear of the cavalry. On the head of 
the column being suddenly engaged, the infantry 
was ordered up; but owing to the blocked and 
otherwise bad condition of the road, it was some 
hours before the leading brigade could get up ; 
and, arriving exhausted and disorganized, it 
could do nothing to restore the day ; for the cav- 
alry was now falling back in disorder. As each 
brigade got up only in time to find the force 
preceding it already beaten, the rout soon 
became general. It was a rush of panic stricken 
men and horses over a narrow road choked up 
with wagons, draught animals and artillery. 
The retreat continued all the way back to Mem- 
phis, a distance of one hundred miles. Our 
dead and wounded, as well as the entire wagon 
train, were left on the ground; and besides a 
heavy loss in men, the enemy captured all our 
artillery and ammunition, ambulances, commis- 
sary stores, hospital supplies and officers' bag- 
gage. 



CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS. 

I. CAMPS, 

1. The rules for the choice of a camp ground 
are as follows : 

(1). The camp should be near good water ; 
if possible, a running stream, for drinking, 
washing, bathing, and general cleanliness. 

(2). It. should be near to woods ; for the 
supply of fuel, for shelters, for repairs of mate- 
rial, and for works of defence. 

(3). The site should be healthy, and the 
ground dry and commodious ; which, in this 
view, should slope more or less. 

(4). It should be near good roads, or other 
communications for the transport of supplies. 

(5). It should be favorably situated for 
defence ; not exposed to be an enfiladed or 
commanded from any point within long cannon 
range ; but, if possible, it should itself com- 
mand all the neighboring ground. 

(6). The communications in rear should 
offer an easy retreat, but no facilities to the 
enemy to attack on that side. 
5* 



56 FIELD SERVICE IIST WAR. 

Where the camp is to remain for only a day 
or two, some of these requisites are obviously 
not essential. 

2. On approaching the camping ground, the 
division or brigade which is to lead the next 
day marches on and encamps in advance of the 
others ; so that there may be no loss of time in 
the morning. 

3. When encamped, as at all other times, 
troops must be advantageously posted, with 
flanks secure, or supported. Guns must be so 
placed as to command every avenue of approach. 
All parts of the force, and all arms must be 
xeady to support each other. 

It was a maxim of Napoleon, that an army 
should be every day, and at all hours, day and 
night, in readiness to fight, and to make all the 
xesistance it is capable of. 

Therefore, a camp, whether in tents or in 
bivouac, must be so arranged that its several 
parts, and also the different arms, shall be in 
their order of battle ; and the extent of the 
color front should never exceed that of the line 
of battle. Guns behind the infantry should be 
kept limbered up ; those in front always unlim- 
bered, and ready to fire. 

4. To camping in line of battle there are two 
objections : 



CAMPS. 57 

First, that the taking up of a long and diffi- 
cult formation requires much time. 

Secondly, that this order of camping, though 
best for defence, is generally unfavorable for a 
prompt taking of the offensive. 

The former of these objections is admitted 
to apply with conclusive force in the case of a 
large army, which must usually camp in the 
same order in which it marches. 

As to the latter objection ; a defensive order 
is the most suitable one for troops in camp, and 
should be used whenever the force is not so con- 
, siderable as to lead to any great loss of time in 
taking it up. But, to enable the encamped 
corps to pass promptly to the offensive, the line 
of battle may consist of double columns at half 
distance, with the arms left stacked #n column. 
In this order, moreover, if suddenly attacked 
by cavalry, the troops could instantly form in 
squares. The bivouac fires and the shelters 
might be on the flanks of their respective 
battalions. The columns might be camped at 
deploying intervals, or with intervals closed, 
according as the ground and other circum- 
stances may render advisable. 

5. Trains and animals should be parked on 
the side the most secure from the enemy. The 



58 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

panic in the Eleventh Corps which led to our 
defeat at Chancellorsville, is said to have been 
commenced by a stampede of the teams and 
beef cattle, which had been left uncovered by 
troops, and which, "on the enemy's sudden ap- 
pearance, rushed over the field, driving the men 
before them. 

6. From published statements, it would 
appear that our force at Shiloh, in April 1862, 
had no Advance Guard ; that it was encamped 
in such a manner as to make a prompt forma- 
tion of the troops in line of battle impossible ; 
that on the side towards the enemy, several 
brigades had their battalions camped in utter 
confusion, in some places, crowded behind each 
other, in others, with considerable gaps between 
them ; thjfc different portions of the same divi- 
sion were scattered miles apart ; that our ex- 
treme left, which w r as towards the enemy, was 
commanded in some places by unguarded 
heights, and, in others, by woods, which our 
troops had neglected to occupy .; that, to com- 
pensate for these deficiencies, we had no 
defences thrown up, not even an epaulement 
for a battery. If all this, or half of it be true, 
the panic and the driving of our troops on the 
first day of the battle are fully accounted for. 



CAMPS. 59 

7. When, from any cause, our outposts cannot 
be relied upon to protect the main body irom 
a surprise attack, we should add to our security 
by throwing up such defences as may be most 
conveniently used. But generally, when not 
threatened by a superior force, intrenching 
should be avoided ; as it shows timidity, and is 
apt to cramp our movements in battle. Raw 
troops, especially, are not over willing to leave 
intrenchments, and are but too ready to return 
to them. 

8. A small camp, much more than a large one, 
is exposed to surprise in a dark or foggy night. 
In such a case, the commander should not 
attempt to form the troops in the camp itself, 
but should rally them in some by-place out of 
sight In our war of Independence, General 
Wayne was encamped with 1,200 men one dark 
night in November, 1777, near Paoli's Tavern, 
Pennsylvania. Suddenly attacked by a British 
force, he attempted to form his men by the camp 
fires ; thereby making them an easy target for 
the enemy's volleys. After 300 of them had 
been shot down, the rest fled in confusion, and 
succeeded in making their escape under cover 
of the darkness. 



60 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

9. When encamped within ear-shot of the 
enemy, the troops must not be roused by drums, 
bugles, or loud commands. 

10. The instant the brigade, division, or army 
corps head-quarters are fixed, their exact local- 
ity should be reported to the next superior 
headquarters. A neglect of this precaution 
during our late war often led to great loss of 
time in the conveyance of orders, resulting 
sometimes in disaster. 

II. CANTONMENTS. 

1. Before the troops go into Cantonments, 
(which are permanent camps), good military 
positions for them should be selected, after a 
careful reconnaissance. 

2. In the choice of these positions, greater 
care is necessary in respect to the health and 
comfort of the men than in the case of a tem- 
porary camp. 

3. Cantonments should be made as secure 
against sudden attack as possible, by intrench- 
ments, lines of abatis, inundations, or other suit- 
able defences. 

4. In winter quarters, troops must usually be 
much scattered for subsistence. Arrangements 

for guard, therefore, require great care. Chains 



CANTONMENTS. 61 

of advanced posts should be constantly kept 
up several miles distant from camp, and sup- 
ported by intermediate detachments ; and the 
country around should be constantly scoured by 
cavalry patrols. 

5. Cantonments should be in rear of a good 
line of defence. 

If the line of defence be a river, several 
points should be chosen for crossings which, 
should all be secured by bridge-heads on both 
sides of the river ; to enable the troops more 
effectually to repulse an attack, and to promptly 
pass to the offensive, in case of need.* 

6. A strong military position should be fixed 
upon as a point of concentration, where the dif- 
ferent corps are to unite if the enemy should 
suddenly take the offensive. This position 
should be in rear of the cantonments ; so that 
the enemy may not, by possessing himself of it, 
be able to beat the divisions separately as they 
come up ; as was done by the Imperialists at 
Marienthal in 1645, Turenne having fixed his 
point of concentration six miles in front, on the 
road towards the enemy. On this occasion, all 
Turenne's skill, desperate personal exposure, 
and the brave fighting and superior numbers of 

*See a Treatise on Intrenchments. Art. Bridge-heads. 



62 FIELD SERVICE IK WAR. 

his troops could not save them from being 
totally routed. 

It would be still worse to have no point of 
concentration fixed at all; as was the case 
in 1841, when the British divisions in canton- 
ments were successively destroyed by the 
Affghans. 

7. The advanced posts of cantonments should 
consist chiefly of light cavalry, instead of in- 
fantry. This kind of force can reconnoitre bet- 
ter at a distance, and can more rapidly concen- 
trate from remote points to oppose the enemy's 
advanced troops, which are, usually, mostly of 
cavalry themselves. 

8. It is imprudent to keep troops cantoned 
in towns or villages. Experience has shown that 
when troops are thus cantoned, there is generally 
great delay in assembling the different corps at 
their respective rendezvous. In the French 
campaign in Poland, in 1807, as soon as the sea- 
son arrived in which military operations became 
possible, Napoleon brought out his troops from 
the villages, and encamped them by divisions, 
which were covered by earthworks and abatis ; 
thus enabling them to defend themselves until 
reinforced. It was well that he did so ; for 
otherwise, the Russian army, which suddenly 



CAKTOKMENTS. 63 

concentrated and fell upon Ney's corps, the 
French Advance Guard,- and drove it back with 
loss, would probably have inflicted on the French 
army a great disaster; instead of being unex- 
pectedly stopped and driven back in its turn, 
through the rapid concentration of all the 
French corps. 



6 



OUTPOSTS 

will be treated of under the following heads : 
I. Generally. 

II. Grand Guards, and Duties of a 
Grand Guard Commander. 

III. Pickets. 

IV. Duties of Pickets. 
V. Sentinels. 

VI. Patrols. 
VII. Duties of the Commander of the 
Outposts. 

i. generally. 
1. The objects of outposts are 

(1). To guard the army in camp from sur- 
prise, and, in case of attack, to give it time to 
form. 

(2). To observe, so far as possible, the num- 
bers, dispositions, and movements of the enemy. 
(3). To screen our own position, numbers, 
and movements from his view. 

These objects are effected by means of sev- 
eral concentric chains of guards surrounding 
the camp, and of patrols ; all under the com- 



66 FIELD SEKVICE IN WAR. 

mand of an officer designated by tour as Com- 
mander of the Outposts. 

2. Our system of outposts has been de- 
rived partly from the English, and partly from 
the French. The introduction of terms from 
both these services has led to some confusion 
in our outpost nomenclature. I shall adopt such 
terms as seem most agreeable to principle, and 
the most general military usage. 

3. The chains of guards are usually three in 
number: {Fig. 2.) 

(1). The outer chain consists of Sentinels, 
Cavalry sentinels are called Vedettes. 

(2.). Considering the chain of sentinels as 
a line of deployed skirmishers, the next line 
consists of their supports. These are small 
detachments, properly called Pickets. 

(3). These, supports, or Pickets have for 
their reserves the inner chain, called Grand 
Guards. 

Sometimes, between the line of Pickets and 
the line of Sentinels, another chain • is estab- 
lished, consisting of petty detachments of six 
men, more or less. This intermediate chain is 
sometimes called u outposts." But as the term 
Outposts is applied to all the parts collectively, 
to prevent ambiguity it is better to call these 



OUTPOSTS. 



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68 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

detachments Small Posts, or Petty Posts. 

4. The Outposts unit is usually a brigade, as in- 
dicated in Figure 2. But where- the brigades are 
small, or where the main body consists of several 
divisions, an entire division is often designated 
for the performance of outpost duty. In that 
case, the diagram, in which three brigades are 
supposed to constitute the entire main body to 
be guarded, will indicate how the outpost duty 
would regularly be performed by an Outposts 
division of three brigades. 

5. Not only three, but as many, even, as six 
or seven chains of outposts have been occasion- 
ally used. To this practice there are two ob- 
jections : 

(1). It robs too many of the nightly re- 
pose necessary to troops undergoing the exhaust- 
ing fatigues of a campaign. 

(2). It gives no additional security. What- 
ever be the number of chains used, it is on the 
vigilance of the outer one that the safety of 
the army mainly depends. The greater the 
number of chains, the less is the responsibility 
felt by the inner ones, and the more, therefore, 
will they relax in their precautions. The Grand 
Guards, especially, on whose prompt resistance 
the army relies to give it time to form, will 



OUTPOSTS. 69 

hardly realize the necessity of being always on 
the alert, with so many chains beyond them to 
give the alarm, and afford them time to pre- 
pare. 

6. The three chains that have been mentioned 
are all that are strictly essential ; that is, 

(1). Sentinels, to guard the camp against 
the entrance of all persons except those known 
to be friends ; and also to watch the enemy, and 
give warning of his approach. 

(2). Pickets, for the sentinels to retire upon, 
and to delay the enemy until the Grand Guard 
can come up. 

(3). A Grand Guard, to hold the enemy in 
check, until the main body has had time to 
form. 

7. When we are in momentary expectation 
of being engaged, there may be no time to estab- 
lish regular outpost chains. In such a case, a 
line of skirmishers, well out, with strong sup- 
ports, may suffice ; as during the advance of the 
Tenth Corps towards Drury's Bluff in 1864; 
where, encamping in its order of march, its out- 
posts consisted of a line of skirmishers, deployed 
at three paces intervals, covered, in some places, 
by slight breastworks or trees ; all kept alert 
and ready, no man or officer being allowed to 
sleep. 



70 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

And, on the other hand, if a sudden advance 
is to be made on the enemy, the entire line of 
sentinels, pickets, and grand guards may be kept 
in front ; thus transformed into a complete sys- 
tem of skirmishers. In this manner we repeat- 
edly marched to battle in the late war. 

8. Normally, each brigade has its own complete 
system of outposts, fmjjiishing two or more com- 
panies for its Grand Guard ; which, again, fur- 
nishes the Pickets ; which, in their turn, send 
out the Sentinels. When the danger of attack 
is imminent, the strength of the Grand Guards 
may be doubled. 

A Grand Guard of two companies would* 
keep one company in reserve as the Grand 
Guard proper, sending out one company to 
constitute two Pickets, of one platoon each ; 
each Picket posting a certain proportion of its 
number (usually one-third) as Sentinels, whom 
it relieves every two hours, or oftener, if cir- 
cumstances require. 

These dispositions are indicated in Figure 2 ; 
showing one-half of the Grand Guard to be 
detached as Pickets; and one-third of each 
Picket posted as Sentinels. 

9. When troops are encamped in any consid- 
erable force, in addition to the Grand Guards in 



OUTPOSTS. 71 

front, the flank brigades also throw out Grand 
Guards on the flanks of the army. 

10. When circumstances make it advisable 
to post the Grand Guards at much greater than 
the usual distance, another detachment, consist- 
ing of several companies, a battalion, or it may 
be, even a whole brigade, is posted at some cen- 
tral point intermediate between the Grand Guard 
and the main body. This is the Reserve of the 
Outposts ; and, together with the outposts of 
all the brigades of the division or corps, is under 
the Commander of the Outposts. 

11. The General Commanding, or the Com- 
mander of the Advance Guard, as the case may 
be, issues an order for the establishment of the 
outposts ; detailing the particular regiments or 
corps, as also the detachments of the three arms 
(when such are required) designed for this 
duty ; directing generally as to where the line 
of sentinels shall be posted, and as to the points 
between which, or in what direction, patrols are 
to be sent out. On this basis, the Commander 
of the Outposts makes his assignments. 

12. On first taking up their positions, the 
Outpost troops march to their posts with the 
usual precautions ; that is, with advanced, 



72 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

flank, and rear patrols ; for the enemy may be 
come upon unawares. 

The entire main body remains under arms 
till the posts are properly established, ready to 
act if the enemy should suddenly make his ap- 
pearance. 

13. Outposts must be so disposed as to cover 
all the avenues by which the enemy may ap- 
proach, in front, or in flank. 

14. The Grand Guards occupy the principal 
avenues leading from the interior to their respec- 
tive Pickets, which they support if attacked, 
and receive if driven in. 

15. Patrols complete the system ; moving 
between the Grand Guards and the Pickets, and 
between the Pickets and the Sentinels; and 
searching all the ground in front not seen by 
the Sentinels. 

16. Whenever a vigorous defence is required, 
the Outposts should consist of troops of the 
three arms. 

In Oaiitosiiraeirts, 

17. Outposts should be much stronger, 
and pushed out much further than in the 
the case of troops, on the field, and posted on 
ground favorable to a strong resistance ; which 
should be strengthened moreover by entrench- 
ments. Their tour of duty, instead of being for 



OUTPOSTS. 73 

twenty-four hours only, will need to be of sev- 
eral days, or sometimes much longer. 

They should consist, usually, of Light Cav- 
alry. But in a woody district, cavalry outposts, 
to protect them against sharp shooters, should be 
supported by infantry. 

18. The requisites of a good system of out- 
posts for Cantonments are, 

(1). Picket stations, commanding a view at 
distance; with a line of supports, posted on 
strong ground in rear. 

(2). Telegraphic signal stations, communi- 
cating with the main body. 

( 3 ). Easy communications for concentration 
on the main body. 

(4.) Patrols kept constantly moving along 
the front, flanks, and if possible, rear of the 
enemy, to get wind of his strategic plans. 

19. No corps should stay long enough in a 
town, or village to become domesticated ; for 
this gets troops into habits of ease and negli- 
gence. 

20. When the field of operations is of con- 
siderable extent, the ordinary outposts will not 
suffice for the complete protection of the army 
in cantonments. An Advance Guard should 
be kept cantoned at the distance of at least one 



74 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

day's march in front, to watch the enemy, and 
receive the first shock of his attack, in case of 
his sudden concentration. 

This Advance Guard should be strongly 
entrenched, and should always consist of the 
three arms ; though a cavalry force alone has 
been known to perform this duty successfully. 
In November, 1864, General Hatch, with his 
division of cavalry, for nearly a month observed 
Hood's army at Florence, keeping up a line of 
outposts fifty miles in extent ; using his force 
so judiciously that the enemy made no move 
without our knowledge, and giving us the first 
notice of his advance northward ; and all this 
without serious loss. 

II. GRAND GUARDS. 

1. It has been the usual practice to make 
details for this duty, of men from different com- 
panies or battalions • but experience has shown 
that it is better to take one entire company, or 
several companies, or an entire battalion for 
this service. For 

(1). The esprit de corps, in such cases, 
causes the duty to be better performed. 

(2). The men being comrades, their mutual 
support is given with more alacrity and zeal. 



GRAND GUARDS. 75 

(3). The men being all personally known 
to the officers, discipline is better enforced. 

2. The tour is usually of twenty-four hours ; 
but circumstances may prevent a Grand Guard 
from being relieved for two or three days. 

3. Being the supports of the Pickets, they 
should be posted, usually, not more than a few 
hundred yards in their rear. Cavalry Grand 
Guards may be 600 or 800 paces behind their 
Pickets; or, on level, unobstructed ground, a 
half a mile or more. 

Their distance from the main body must vary, 
according to the nature of the ground and the 
proximity of the enemy, from five hundred 
yards to a mile or more. It should always be 
sufficient to give time to the main body, in case 
the outposts are attacked, to take arms and 
form. 

4. It is the enemy's uncertainty as to where 
he may come upon a Grand Guard that secures 
the whole ground encircled . by the outposts 
against his patrols and reconnoitring parties. A 
Grand Guard should therefore be out of the en- 
emy's view ; and for the same reason, its position 
should be occasionally changed. When prac- 
ticable, it should occupy a different position at 
night from the one held during the day. 

7 



76 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

5. Grand Guards should occupy points easily 
defensible, as enclosures, hamlets or villages, 
defiles, &c. ; or supply the absence of these by 
abatis or other obstructions, or by entrenching, 
if there be time, to enable them to check the 
enemy's advance as long as possible. 

6. The different Grand Guards must be so 
posted as to connect promptly with each other. 
No steep ravine, stream, swamp, or thick wood, 
should separate them. But if this cannot be 
avoided, means of easy passage should be pro- 
vided, and every officer and man instructed as 
to where they are. 

7. If there be a defile between the Grand 
Guard and the main body, by which the enemy 
might turn the line of posts, or cut off their 
retreat, it should be occupied by a strong de- 
tachment. 

8. There should be no broken or obstructed 
ground between the Grand Guard and its 
Pickets. It is better, in such cases, to post 
the whole, the chain of sentinels included, on 
either the further or the hither side of the 
difficult ground; the hither side being usually 
preferable. But a ravine or a stream, parallel 
to the line of outposts, is an advantage, inas- 
much as it offers a good line of defence. 



GRAKD GUARDS. 77 

9. A Grand Guard arriving at night never 
sends out Pickets or Sentinels until patrols have 
examined the ground around. 

10. On a desertion being reported, the Grand 
Guard changes its position at once, and a new 
countersign is substituted. 

11. All the approaches, especially those on 
the flank, should be obstructed, or at least 
watched ; but the obstructions should not be 
such as to cramp the movements of the Grand 
Guard, or disable it from acting offensively. 

12. The Grand Guard keeps a sentinel con- 
stantly posted in its front, to notify it of any- 
thing unusual appearing in the line of Pickets 
or of Sentinels. 

13. All must be alert at night ; but, in the 
day time, one-half may sleep at once. Of a 
cavalry Grand Guard, one-half keep always 
mounted at night ; the other half, in rear, sit 
with bridles in hand. 

14. If the enemy advance to attack, notice is 
forthwith sent to the main body, and to the 
Grand Guards next on the flanks ; which latter 
either act against the enemy's flanks, or con- 
centrate on the point threatened or attacked, 
according to circumstances. 



78 FIELD SERVICE IN WAK. 

15. Pickets and Sentinels are instructed, 
when driven in, to rejoin their Grand Guards by 
a circuitous route designated beforehand. This 
will sometimes enable the Grand Guard, whose 
position is usually unknown to the enemy, to 
fall unexpectedly on his flank; which will be 
very apt to throw him into confusion and rout 
him. 

16. Both Grand Guards and Pickets should 
move fomoard in support, in order to give as 
much time as possible to the main body in rear 
to prepare. 

But if the hostile force be too strong to admit 
of this, the sentinels rally as skirmishers on 
their Pickets, and the Pickets fall back on their 
Grand Guards, retiring as slowly as possible, 

A Grand Guard should not retire until re- 
joined by all its Pickets and patrols. 

I>xii:ies of* o, Grr^ixcl Guard Ooiii.ina,iicie:r» 

17. His first duty is to inspect his Guard, and 
their arms and ammunition, and to see that they 
are supplied with subsistence according to the 
time they are expected to be on duty. 

18. He should go with one-half of his com- 
mand, in company with the Commander of the 
Outposts, or his staff officer, and under the instrue- 



PICKETS. 79 

tions received, establish posts for his Pickets and 
Sentinels, both for the day and for the night. 

19. If, on relieving the old Guard, he finds it 
necessary to make any change in this respect, 
he immediately reports the change to the Com- 
mander of the Outposts. 

20. As soon as the posts are established, he 
has his Picket commanders and chain of senti- 
nels instructed by what route they are to fall 
hack on their supports, if attacked by superior 
force. 

III. PICKETS. 

1. The Pickets are furnished by the Grand 
Guard. Their strength is calculated according 
to the number of sentinel posts they are to 
keep supplied. Thus, if the Picket is to keep 
out four groups of sentinels of three men each, 
this will make each relief to consist of twelve 
men ; and if the Picket is divided, as is usual^ 
into three reliefs, this w r ill make the entire 
Picket to consist of thirty-six men, exclusive of 
officers and sub-officers. A Picket is always 
commanded, when practicable, by a commis- 
sioned officer. 

2. If the Pickets are of infantry, some 
mounted men should be attached to patrol in 
advance, and to convey intelligence to the rear. 

7* 



80 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

But it is very unwise, as was repeatedly 
shown in our late war, to exhaust cavalry 
horses by requiring of them more picket duty 
that is absolutely necessary. Cavalry has enough 
to do in picketing for itself and for the artillery. 
Infantry should do its own picketing, except 
where special emergencies call for cavalry. 

Too much continuous picketing was another 
fault often committed in our late war. A judi- 
cious choice of points for picketing will save a 
great many horses. 

3. Pickets are posted a few hundred yards in 
front of their Grand Guards ; the distance vary- 
ing according to the proximity of the enemy, 
and the nature of the ground. When the ground 
is broken or obstructed, the distance should be 
small. 

A cavalry picket may be safely posted at a 
much greater distance out than an infantry one, 
unless the ground be unfavorable for its move- 
ments. If the ground be even, and the view 
unobstructed, a cavalry picket may be pushed 
out from half a mile to a mile in front of its 
Grand Guard. 

After a battle, or when the position is to be held 
for some time, the distance is greater, to give 
better repose. 



PICKETS. 81 

. 4. Infantry pickets should not be over six 
hundred paces apart; but cavalry pickets may 
be fifteen hundred paces apart. 

5. Pickets are posted on the chief avenues 
communicating with their Grand Guards, and 
always on the roads leading to the enemy ; at 
the meeting ot cross roads, when practicable. 

6. The position should be chosen with refer- 
ence to its facilities for observation, rather than 
for defence ; and should be -one, if possible, from 
which the Picket may see, without being seen. 

7. So far as practicable, Pickets should be in 
sight of their Grand Guards, and of their Sen- 
tinels. Where this is not possible, they should 
post a sentinel at an intermediate point, to 
report what happens. 

8. If the position is to be held by the corps 
for some days, or longer, the Picket posts should 
be occasionally changed. 

9. If there be a bridge near the point indi- 
cated for the post, the Picket had better be 
posted on the bridge itself from which it can 
see up and down the stream m M mounted men 
being sent to patrot beyond it. 

10. Besides the regular line of Picket posts, 
it is sometimes necessary to establish an Inde- 
pendent Picket, in order to watch at, or guard, 



82 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

some isolated point. It is furnished from the 
nearest Grand Guard, or Eeserve of the Out- 
posts. 

IY. DUTIES OF PICKETS. 

1. They keep a constant lookout for the ene- 
my ; and, when in his presence, keep themselves 
constantly informed of his strength, position 
and movements. 

2. Signals are concerted between them and 
their sentinels* to be used in case of the latter 
seeing anything suspicious. 

3. If hostile troops are seen marching, the 
Picket commander reports the fact at once to 
the Grand Guard commander, with all the par- 
ticulars. 

4. The Picket commander's reports are always 
made in writing, and distinguishing always be- 
tween what he has seen himself, and what has 
been only reported to him. 

This rule is of the greatest importance, and 
is applicable to all military reports in the field, 
whatever be their occasion, or the rank of the 
officer making them. 

5. The Picket commander sees that every 
sentinel is fully instructed as to his duties before 
he is posted ; and should occasionally, and at 



DUTIES OF PICKETS. 83 

unexpected times, make the round of his senti- 
nels, to see that they are vigilant, and faithful 
in obeying their instructions. 

6. The men of the Picket are instructed, that, 
if captured, they are to answer no questions 
whatever, except to give their name, their com- 
pany and regiment; these particulars being 
necessary to enable them to be exchanged. 

7. Great caution must be observed by the 
Picket commander to prevent unnecessary alarms) 
which are often caused by the enemy at night, 
merely to harass the troops and prevent their 
getting rest. 

8. On hearing a noise in the direction of a 
sentinel, the Picket commander goes with a few 
men to find out the cause. If caused by the 
enemy's advance, he takes his measures accord- 
ingly ; falling back, if it should become neces- 
sary, on his Grand Guard. 

If the enemy suddenly attack between the 
outposts and the main body, he cuts his way to 
the rear with his Picket, as best he can. 

9. Pickets only observe the enemy. On being 
attacked, they resist only enough to feel him. 
Resistance to hold him in check belongs to the 
Grand Guard. 



84 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

But a Picket must retire only before a supe- 
rior force ; and then, slowly enough to give the 
Grand Guard time to act. The sentinels rally 
on their pickets. 

10. In retiring, the Picket moves toward the 
flank of the force in rear, so as to unmask it and 
allow it to act. 

11. No outpost should occupy a house or 
other building, unless ordered to do so ; because 
such a position is unfavorable to the exercise of 
proper vigilance, and is moreover peculiarly lia- 
ble to surprise. 

12. The men of the post must never all eat 
or sleep at once. 

In cavalry pickets, the horses are watered in 
pairs. At night, one-half of the picket is 
mounted; the rest remain seated, arms and bri- 
dles in hand. 

13. If fire is needed, it is hidden as much as 
possible. Only one half of the men should be 
near it ; the rest being ready to repulse the 
enemy. 

Under certain circumstances, picket fires 
should not be allowed at all. In the Waterloo 
campaign, the Allies had notice of the approach 
of Napoleon's Grand Army twenty-four hours 
sooner than they otherwise would, from the 



PICKETS, 85 

reflection at night in the sky of the picket fires 
of its Advance Guard. 

14. Pickets should be relieved from the Grand 
Guard at daybreak. But the old guard should 
not retire from the ground, till the patrols come 
in and report all safe. 

15. When the camp is behind a river, the 
Pickets should forthwith secure all boats and 
other means of transport that can be found, to 
prevent their being used by the enemy. 

In the Peninsular war, Wellington's most bril- 
liant achievement was his crossing of the Douro 
at Oporto, in face of the French army under 
Soult. A small boat had escaped the vigilance 
of the French outposts on the further side, and 
had been brought over in the night by some 
individual to the British side of the river. It 
was at once seized, and three persons, crossing 
over in it, returned in half an hour with some 
large barges, in which troops were sent over. 
These effected a lodgment in a large and strong 
building, then vacant, with an extensive walled 
enclosure, which was already occupied before 
the French were aware of the movement. Under 
cover of this strong position the British then 
came pouring over by thousands, and the French 



86 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

army was compelled to immediately evacuata 
the city. 

V. SENTINELS. 

1. The distance from a chain of sentinels back 
to their Pickets should be from two hundred to 
three hundred paces. The distance of cavalry 
vedettes may be from six hundred to eight hun- 
dred paces. 

These distances are more or less reduced at 
night, in foggy weather, or in a very broken or 
obstructed country. 

2. Sentinels should be so posted as to be able 
to see all the ground between their respective 
posts, and to be able to stop any one passing 
between them. 

3. The best system for a chain of sentinels is 
in groups of three men each, the groups being 
one hundred and fifty yards apart. The centre 
maiLof each group stands fast, watching on both 
sides, while the other two patrol to and from the 
groups on their right and left. By this arrange- 
ment alone can the whole ground be constantly 
observed. An attempt to secure this object with 
groups of only two sentinels, by making them 
all walk in the same direction, will always prove 
futile, especially at night. 



SENTINELS. 87 

4. At night, or in foggy weather, the senti- 
nels may be doubled, and drawn close in to the 
Pickets. 

5. The chain of sentinels is properly posted 
along the bank of a river, the edge of a ravine, 
or of a marsh, or along the crest of a ridge, or 
on the skirt of a wood ; but in all these cases 
it should be on the hither side. 

6. In the day time, the sentinels are posted 
on the high ground, for a more extensive view; 
but at night, the posts are withdrawn to the low 
ground„ from which, unseen themselves, they 
can distinguish moving objects against the sky. 

7. A sentinel post should not be within range 
of sharp shooters from a building or enclosure, 
a ravine, a wood, op other cover; or near any 
hiding place from which the sentinel could be 
easily surprised. 

8. An extra line of sentinels is sometimes 
necessary between the Grand Guard and the 
main body, for the rapid transmission of intelli- 
gence. It is furnished by the Grand Guard. 

9. Sentinels, as well as Pickets, should be kept 
concealed as much as possible. If exposed to 
fire, they may dig a rifle pit, or throw up some 
sort of shelter of earth, or logs of wood. For 
this purpose, when near the enemy, every 

8 



88 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Picket post should be supplied with axes and 
shovels. 

10. At night, when anything suspicions is 
seen or heard, one of the sentinels of the group 
is sent to the Picket post to report. 

11. Flags of truce are sometimes sent by the 
enemy only for purposes of observation. They 
are never allowed to pass the chain of sentinels 
except by special order. If, after report made 
to the Commander of the Outposts, a flag of 
truce is allowed to enter the lines, the bearer, 
whatever be his rank, is first blindfolded, and 
then led to the General Commanding. When 
several persons accompany the flag of truce, 
only one of them is allowed to enter. 

12. Deserters from the enemy are admitted 
only one at a time ; and are immediately dis- 
armed and sent to the Commander of the Out- 
posts, in order to be examined as to the infor- 
mation they are possessed of. 

13. But deserters in a body, however small, 
must never be allowed to approach the line of 
sentinels until they have first laid down their 
arms. If they refuse or neglect to do this after 
being warned, they must be instantly fired on, 
and the entire Picket turned out to act as may 
be necessary. Early in 1865, parties of Con- 



PATROLS. 89 

federate deserters had been repeatedly allowed 
to approach our lines at Petersburg without 
laying down their arms. On the 25th of March, 
several squads of Confederate soldiers stole up 
as deserters, and suddenly overpowered the 
picket posts. Eight after them came a strong 
storming force of picked men, followed by three 
heavy columns of the enemy. The guard of 
the trenches tried in vain to check their advance, 
but was overwhelmed by numbers. Our main 
line was broken in, several batteries carried, and 
finally, Fort Steadman itself, which covered the 
extreme right of our line, was captured and 
occupied. Then the enemy sw^ept our lines to 
the right and left, and pushed onto gain the City 
Point Railroad, our line of supply. The Army 
of the Potomac was thus placed in the greatest 
danger ; when, through the prompt energy and 
skill of General Hartranft, the enemy was driven 
back and Fort Steadman recaptured ; but the 
day's disaster had cost us a thousand men. 

' VI. PATKOLS. 

1. The system of outposts is completed by 
patrols, or small detachments of three or four 
men, furnished by the Grand Guard, under an 
officer, or a sub-officer. They go the rounds, from 



90 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

time to time, along the chain of sentinels, 
between the sentinel posts; sometimes a few 
hundred yards in advance of the chain ; and 
also between the Pickets. Their use is to keep 
the Pickets and sentinels always on the alert, 
and to search places which may hide the enemy's 
scouts. For this service, cavalry is always pre- 
ferable to infantry. 

2. When patrolling towards the enemy, espe- 
cially at night, the men should sometimes dis- 
mount and apply the ear to the ground, to lis- 
ten for the inarching of troops or the rolling of 
carriage w^heels ; sounds which may be heard, 
by this means, at a far greater distance than 
when transmitted through the air. 

3. Patrols are also sent out by the Com- 
mander of the Outposts, * to visit the various 
Grand Guards. 

4. In order to secure the constant vigilance 
of the outposts, patrols are never sent out at 
stated times, or at regular periods ; except that 
one is always sent out at daybreak, this being 
the hour best suited for a surprise. At night, 
and in foggy weather, the patrols should be fre- 
quent. 

5. Neither should a patrol be sent out habit- 
ually from the same point or in the same direc- 



DUTIES OF AN OUTPOSTS COMMANDER. 91 

ion ; for this would enable the enemy to ambus- 
cade it, or else to follow it in, and thus take the 
outpost by surprise. 

6. The presence near our lines of a staff offi- 
cer of the enemy's Commander-in-Chief is usu- 
ally a significant fact, indicative of danger. A 
patrol should never fire upon such an officer^ 
but should capture and bring him in. 
# 

VII. DUTIES OF A COMMANDER OF THE OUTPOSTS. 

These are so various, according to the circum- 
stances, as to defy enumeration. The principal 
ones are 

1. To reconnoitre as far in advance as maybe 
safe, obtaining all the information possible by 
questioning the inhabitants, and by other 
means, as to the position, number, and intentions 
of the enemy ; and for the same purpose, to be 
constantly feeling towards him by patrols ; using 
every means to watch his movements, and try- 
ing to guess what he is about to do. 

If the Confederate patrols, early in the morn- 
ing of the battle of Bull Eun, had scoured all 
the approaches to their position, our attack on 
the Confederates' left would not have been a 
surprise that nearly lost them the day. On the 
contrary, informed thereby, that our main 
8* 



92 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

attack was to be on that side, instead of owing 
a barren victory to a panic of raw militia, they 
would have concentrated upon us their whole 
force, and thus destroyed or captured a large 
part of our army. 

Again ; on the 10th of April, 1862, a large 
Confederate army surprised several of our reg- 
iments in their tents at about 8 o'clock in the 
morning. This led to a panic, and the driving 
back of our troops a considerable distance. 
This disgrace to our arms and the slaughter that 
attended it, could not have happened if our out- 
posts had that morning done their duty. The 
enemy was known to be concentrated in large 
force within twenty miles ; in fact, he had 
attacked, our outposts with a considerable force 
only two days before, and there was no excuse 
for neglecting any of the usual precautions for 
the safety of an army in camp ; more especially, 
as our troops seem to have been encamped so 
irregularly, and in such confusion, as to render 
it impossible to form them promptly in line of 
battle in case of sudden attack. 

It has been claimed that every precaution 
had been taken against surprise ; that outposts 
had been properly established ; that six com- 
panies of infantry were thrown forward on the 



DUTIES OF AN OUTPOSTS COMMANDER. 93 

Hamburg road, which led upon our left flank, 
and a squadron of cavalry sent beyond Ham- 
burg itself; though it does not appear that we 
had out any troops in observation towards Mon- 
terey, on the road whch led directly to our 
front. However this may be, it is self-evident, 
that if the patrolling had been properly directed 
and performed, our troops would not have been 
attacked by a large army, many of them unpre- 
pared in their camps, three hours and a half 
after daylight. * 

2. To study carefully the ground in his front, 
so as to be able to delay the enemy as long as 
possible in case of an attack. 

3. To have made a sketch of the ground cov- 
ered by the outposts, showing their respective 
locations ; which sketch he turns over to the 
Commander who succeeds him, at the same time 
pointing out to him all the approaches leading 
from the enemy, and imparting all other infor- 
mation in his possession that might be useful. 

4. When prisoners are brought to his head- 
quarters, he should extract from them all he 
possibly can relative to the strength, position, 
movements, and intentions of the enemy. Even 
when prisoners refuse to give any information 
beyond their names, and the company and regi- 



94 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

ment to which they belong, these particulars 
will often furnish an important clue to the en- 
emy's actual numbers and position, by being 
compared with a list of his divisions and 
brigades, of what regiments composed and 
by whom commanded, which it is generally not 
difficult to make up from information received 
from spies, deserters, intercepted despatches, 
and (in these days), the enemy's own newspa- 
pers. 

5. To make written reports to the General 
Commanding, or to the commander of the Ad- 
vance Guard, as the case may be, of all he has 
learned during his tour of duty ; distinguishing 
carefully between what he has seen himself and 
what he has learned from others. 



CONVOYS 

Are trains of supplies for an army in the field ; 
but the principles relating to the conduct, the 
attack, or the defence of a Convoy are equally 
applicable in the case of a baggage train march- 
ing by itself, or of prisoners of war guarded by 
an escort. 

The subject will be treated of under the fol- 
lowing heads : 

I. General Dispositions. 

II. The Train and its March. 

III. The Escort and its March. 

IV. Passage of Defiles. 

V. Parking of the Train. 

VI. Defence of a Convoy. 
VII. Attack of a Convoy. 

I. GENERAL DISPOSITIONS. 

1. Small convoys are safer than large ones ; 
which usually tempt the enemy to attack and 
capture them. 

It is highly dangerous to trust everything in 
one convoy. In the campaign of 1758, in the 



96 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Seven Years' War, the Prussians were besieging 
Olmutz in Moravia. A convoy of 4000 wagons, 
containing a vast quantity of ammunition and 
other supplies requisite for the siege, was coming 
to them from Neisse, in Silesia, escorted by 
eight battalions of infantry, 1,000 horse, and 
3,000 recruits. On its being threatened, Fred- 
erick sent a strong detachment to meet it, under 
the valiant and skilful Ziethen. But the Aus- 
trians were in such numbers that they defeated 
all the troops, and took or burned nearly the 
whole convoy ; only two hundred wagons suc- 
ceeding in reaching the Prussian camp. The 
result was that Frederick had not only to raise 
the siege, but to evacuate both Moravia and 
Bohemia. 

2. Convoys should never be sent at regular 
periods ; for this would enable the enemy to 
lie in wait to attack them. 

3. A convoy should always have a strong 
escort A weak escort will always tempt an 
attack. The convoy commander should be sub- 
ordinate to the commander of the escort. 

4. When a convoy is of great importance, 
one or more detachments should be thrown out 
between it and the enemy, to cover its march. 
A cavalry force will be best for this purpose. In 



CONVOYS. THE TRAIN. 97 

December, 1862, General Buell's wagon train 
was fifteen miles long. He marched it twelve 
miles out from his least exposed flank, and effec- 
tually screened its march by a brigade of cav- 
alry which scouted all the roads. 

5. If we have posts along the route, they 
should be notified of the convoy's departure ; 
so that they may push out patrols to watch for 
the enemy, and give timely warning of his ap- 
proach. 

6. The escort commander must conceal from 
all except the officer commanding his advance, 
where he means to park at night, and the road 
he means to take in the morning ; because in the 
enemy's country, among the wagoners, mule- 
teers, or other persons that have necessarily to 
be employed about every convoy, there are 
usually spies. 

II. THE TRAIN AND ITS MARCH. 

1. Pack animals travel better in front of the 
wagons, than behind them. 

2. The pioneers' tool wagon should lead the 
whole ; with chevaux de frise, to keep off cav- 
alry. 

3. The train is in four sections. 

Powder and money are carried in the second 
section, as being the safest. 



98 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Provisions, and other supplies are distributed 
equally through all the sections. 

4. The train is kept well closed, the wagons 
four paces apart. 

The leading wagon must slacken pace to let 
the others come up, when retarded by an obsta- 
cle ; and the commander of the leading section 
will sometimes halt it, to enable the rest of the 
train to close up; especially near the enemy. 

5. If practicable, each wagon should have a 
soldier to guard it ; or each section should be 
attended by four or five horsemen, moving up 
and down the line, to see if all goes on well. 

6. The march is always in double file when 
the width of the road permits. But there 
should be no change from single to double un- 
less the march can continue double for at least 
one hour ; for time is lost in changing. 

7. The manner of doubling is shown in Fig- 
ure 3. 

The wagons of the first and third sections file 
out to the right. The second and fourth simply 
close up. 

8. The manner of undoubling is shown in 
Figure 4. 

The wagons of the first and third sections file 
out to the left, quickening the pace ; the move- 



CONVOYS. — THE TBAIIST. 99 



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100 



FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 



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section has passed the leading wagon of the sec- 



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UNDOUBLING COMPLETED 





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tion it is to precede; the fourth section slacken- 
ing the pace, to make room for the third. 



CONVOYS. THE ESCORT, 101 

9. An army has seldom or never with it suf- 
ficient transportation for its stores and supplies ; 
and this has therefore to be furnished, in a 
greater or less degree, by the inhabitants of the 
country. In an enemy's country, the teamsters 
and muleteers attached to the convoy, being 
enemies, are naturally tempted, on its being 
attacked, to cut the harness and escape with 
their animals in the confusion. To prevent 
this, they should be notified that they will be 
fired at if they try to escape ; and orders should 
be issued accordingly to the escort. 

III. THE ESCORT AND* ITS MARCH. 

1. The escort should always consist of both 
infantry and cavalry, and sometimes of all the 
three arms. 

Infantry is always necessary, as it can fight 
on all kinds of ground ; and under, or behind 
the wagons, or within them. 

Cavalry is also needed. Each wagon, with 
four horses, occupies ten yards of road, one hun- 
dred wagons, one thousand yards, and five hun- 
dred wagons, five thousand yards, or nearly 
three miles. Attacked by hostile cavalry, such 
a length of column could never be successfully 
defended by infantry alone. 



102 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Apart from this, some horsemen are always 
necessary, to scout the road to a considerable dis- 
tance in advance of the convoy. 

2. The escort is divided in to five parts : 
(1). An advance guard, preceded by 

(2). A small cavalry detachment,to examine 
the ground. 

(3). A rear guard. 

(4). Flank detachments. 

(5). The main body. 

3. The main body is itself divided into four 
parts : 

(1). One-half, as a reserve. 

(2). One -fourth, as a guard marching at the 
centre of the convoy, called the centre convoy 
division. 

(3). One eighth, a detachment marching at 
the head of the train, called the head convoy 
division. 

(4). One eighth, a detachment marching in 
rear of the train, called the rear convoy divi- 
sion. 

4. The proper order of march is as follows : 
(1). The cavalry detachment, thrown as 

far forward as may be safe, to examine the 
ground. 

(2). The advance guard, one thousand 
paces, more or less, in front of the train. 



CONVOYS. — THE ESCORT. 103 

(3). The head convoy division. 
(4). The rear convoy division. 
(5). The rear guard, at the distance of one 
thousand paces, more or less, behind the train. 

The reserve marches, usually, near the centre 
of the train. 

The flank detachments, usually of cavalry, 
are kept as far out as circumstances admit ; each 
platoon keeping out flankers on its outer flank. 
The head and rear convoy divisions keep close 
to the convoy. 

The centre division should march in two 
detachments, one on each side of the train. An 
opening of eight or ten paces should be left in 
the train, to enable them to pass through from 
one side to the other. 

The escort divisions march, of course, by the 
flank, when there is no room for a march by the 
front. 

Pioneers precede the train, to repair the 
roads, bridges, &c, and remove obstructions. 
They may be also needed in rear, to destroy 
bridges, and obstruct defiles, after the passage of 
the rear guard. 

5. The order of march of an entire convoy 
with its escort is shown in Fig. 5. 



104 



FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 



Fig. 5 



CAVALRY oDETACHMENT 
ADVANCE* GUARD 



PIONEERS 
HEAD CONVOY D!V. 



4= 

CENTRE -CONVOY D1Y. 
FLANK DETACHMENT ■■ =J= FLANK DETACHMENT, 

1 . Si .&** • • 

hF Reserve 



4= 
4= 

REAR CCNV.0Y D I V. 



REAR GUARD 



CONVOYS. — PASSAGE OF DEFILES. 105 

6. In the march of a convoy, the escort should 
redouble the usual precautions of a marching 
column against surprise. 

7. The advance guard must occupy the 
debouches of all lateral roads by detachments, 
which may be relieved from the reserve when 
it comes up. 

IY. PASSAGE OF DEFILES. 

1. On the convoy's arrival at a defile, it is 
parked near the entrance in lines of sections. 

The centre convoy division joins the advance 
guard, to strengthen it. The rear guard takes 
a position to cover the rear. The reserve keeps 
a central position. The flank detachments 
remain on the flanks. 

2. The reserve then sends forward a detach- 
ment into the defile to secure its flanks, and also 
the outlet on the other side. This detachment, 
on arriving at the outlet, sends out patrols in 
all directions, to examine the ground in front. 

3. When the patrols report all safe, the 
advance guard and the centre convoy division 1 
pass the defile, and go far enough beyond it to 
cover parking ground on the other side. 

4. The reserve and the flank detachments 
cover the flanks of the convoy till it arrives in 



106 FIELD SERVICE IK WAK. 

position on the other side, and then go to their 
posts in column. 

The rest of the escort and the rear guard fol- 
low as soon as the convoy is in position. 

5. Before the convoy resumes its march, it 
will be well to send out detachments in different 
directions to reconnoitre, in order to prevent 
surprise. 

6. These precautions in passing a defile should 
never be omitted, except when unnecessary, from, 
there being an unobstructed view over the 
whole country around, or from ' its being abso- 
lutely certain that there is no enemy in the 
neighborhood; because a convoy, resolutely 
attacked in a defile, is sure to be captured or 
destroyed ; and convoys are sometimes so im- 
portant that the loss of one may cause the loss 
of a campaign. 

7. If the enemy already occupies the heights 
or woods forming the flanks of the defile, and 
we have not force enough to dislodge him, there 
is no course left but to dash the convoy through 
as rapidly as possible. 

But if the enemy be also awaiting us in force 

at the outlet of the defile, the situation is so 

■ dangerous that the escort commander must 

decide upon one or the other of two courses ; 



PARKING OF THE TRAIN*. 107 

either to fight a battle, which, if successful, will 
enable him to push the convoy through, or to 
save it by a retreat.^ The more pressing the 
importance to our arms of the prompt arrival 
of the convoy at its destination, and the greater 
the apparent chances in our favor in the com- 
bat, the more decisively will the former of these 
two courses be indicated ; and vice versa. 

V. PARKING OF THE TRAIN. 

1. On halting for the night, park in a strong 
position ; offering, if possible, but one side for 
attack. 

2. In parking, when practicable, all the wagon 
poles should be turned in one direction, pointing 
toward the place of destination. This saves 
time in resuming the march. 

3. When the convoy contains powder, it is 
not safe to park in a village, or even to pass 
through one. 

4. If a halt for more than one night be 
intended, park the wagons in lines of sections ; 
the lines about fifteen paces apart. Cover the 
flank openings by wagons placed across them as 
traverses. 

5. The strongest defensive park is in the 

*See " Forcing a Defile" in a Treatise on " The Special Opera- 
tions of War." 



108 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

form of a square ; which, in case of attack, will 
serve as redoubt. 

On the square being formed, 

(1). See that the ground around afford no 
cover to an enemy within musket range. 

(2). Cover the angles of the square with 
chevaux de frise, abatis, or other obstruc- 
tions. 

(3). Flank the faces of the square with guns, 
if there be any ; supported by infantry or cav- 
alry detachments in rear. 

(4). Post the convoy divisions and the 
reserve inside of the park ; the divisions behind 
their respective convoy sections ; the reserve 
in the centre ; the advance and rear guards and 
the flank detachments outside of the park, with 
their outposts and sentinels. 

(5). Place ammunition wagons, or other 
valuable ones, inside of the square. 

The train, according to its size, may be formed 
into one square, or into several squares. The 
formation of a park may be also in a circle. 

6. If the convoy consist of powder, the 
escort must in no case, when attacked, take 
refuge in the park ; for this would greatly 
endanger both the powder and the escort itself 
by the enemy's fire. And care must be taken 



DEFENCE OF A CONVOY. 109 

that the camp fires be always to the leeward of 
powder wagons and of batteries. 

7. If there be not wagons enough to enclose 
troops, they may be parked in a single line. In 
this case, the wagons are placed wheel to 
wheel, with an outlet of three or four feet 
between every six of them, a wagon being 
placed lengthwise behind each opening, as a 
traverse ; the horses picketed opposite their 
wagons. 

8. If the convoy be threatened during its 
march, and have no time to park in square, rap- 
idly form in double file, and face the wagons 
inwards, the horses' heads nearly touching in the 
centre of the road, and the wagons as close 
together as possible. 

If the wagons be already in double column, 
the defensive park may be promptly formed by 
wheeling; them round to the ri^ht and left, so as 
to face inwards. 

9. The proper place for guns is always at an 
angle of the park, the faces of which they thus 
protect from assault by a flank fire ; or at some 
weak point, or where the ground in front can be 
most completely swept. 

VI. DEFENCE OF A CONVOY. 

1. The defence of a convoy of any consider- 
able length is one of the most difficult of mili- 



110 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

tary operations, as, on the other hand, the cap- 
ture of one is one of the easiest. For, while 
the assailants can concentrate for the attack, 
the defenders cannot concentrate for the 
defense. 

2. When the escort is stronger than the hos- 
tile force which threatens the convoy, and has 
time to concentrate before the attack, it should 
at once march to anticipate the enemy and 
overthrow him. 

But this will rarely be practicable ; because, 
in order to prevent a concentration of the 
escort, the attack of a convoy is usually made 
by surprise. 

3. We should park only when it is plainly 
necessary, as this always occasions a loss of 
time, which might enable the enemy to be rein- 
forced. If, therefore, on being threatened with 
an attack, we see in front a village, a wood, a 
stream, or any other position which would facili- 
tate a defence, we should hurry the convoy up to it. 

4. The formation of a defensive park has been 
already explained. On its being attacked, some 
of the convoy divisions throw out skirmishers 
while others fire from the wagons. If the fire 
does not repulse the enemy, the reserve sallies 
and charges with the bayonet. 



DEFENCE OF A CONVOY. Ill 

5. No fixed rules can be laid down for the 
defence of a convoy, which must obviously vary 
according to the mode and circumstances of the 
attack. It will suffice to observe, 

First, That if the attack be made on a single 
point alone, the nearest portions of the escort 
should concentrate to repel it; and that, if 
necessary, the whole escort should concentrate 
for this purpose. 

Secondly, That if the attack be made on dif- 
ferent parts of the train at the same time, 

(1). The advance and rear guards, and 
flank detachments will close in on the convoy, 
to act as may be needful. 

(2). The head and rear convoy divisions 
will generally keep their positions, to defend the 
first and fourth sections of the convoy respec- 
tively. 

(3). The centre convoy division will con- 
centrate on the flank attacked, and take a posi- 
tion to cover the two centre sections. 

(4). The reserve will take a position from 
which it can the soonest support the troops 
engaged, and most effectively aid in repulsing 
the attack. Finally, it must be borne in mind 
that, though a convoy may be easily captured 
by a sudden rush of the enemy, it may as easily 
10 



112 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

be recaptured by a sudden and vigorous charge 
of the escort. 

6. When there is great peril, the enemy may 
be allowed to capture or pillage a part of a con- 
voy, in order to save the remainder. 

The ammunition and the subsistence stores 
are always the most important to be saved. 

7. Sometimes an entire section of a convoy 
may be saved by taking some by-road in the 
heat of the engagement. 

8. In case of necessity, the convoy horses may 
be used to double the artillery teams and thus 
enable the artillery to escape. 

9. If we are unable to save even a part of 
the convoy by abandoning the rest, we should 
try to save, at least, the horses. If this be im- 
possible, we should kill the horses, and burn or 
blow up the entire convoy ; so that, at all events, 
the enemy may derive no advantage from it. 

VII. ATTACK OF A CONVOY. 

1. The capture of a convoy is generally an 
easy task, even with a force inferior to the 
escort ; since the escort is obliged to keep on 
a strict defensive, close to the train, and to re- 
main scattered in small detachments. 



ATTACK OF A CONVOY. 113 

The bestmethod of attacking is by an ambus- 
cade ; threatening several points at once, to 
prevent the enemy from concentrating. 

2. If the object be to capture the ivhole con- 
voy : 

Beat and disperse the escort, while a detach- 
ment secures the convoy. 

If the object be to cut off apart: 
Threaten another part ; and when the convoy 
troops are withdrawn from the part wanted, cut 
it off. 

If the object be merely to delay the march: 
Threaten the convoy often, in order to force 
it to halt and park. Obstruct the roads and 
break down the bridges in its front. 

3. To attack a convoy parked in a square or 
Circle for defence, artillery may be needed ; as 
it is difficult to force such a park with infantry 
alone, unless the escort be very feeble, or there 
be covers close by, from which, ^after firing, we 
may rush onthe park. Otherwise, a few shells 
dropped in its interior will be usually the speed- 
iest means of accomplishing the object. 

4. In attacking a convoy in a defile, seize the 
leading wagons and place them across the road, 
so as to block the passage of the rest. 

5. When our attack on the convoy has suc- 
ceeded, our main body is kept together, while 



114 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

the train is being secured or destroyed by a 
detachment. The cavalry captures or disperses 
the escort, and brings in all the horses cut loose. 

We should have spare horses in harness 
along with us, to replace those of the convoy 
that may be killed, maimed or cut loose. 

6. On taking a convoy, first find out from the 
prisoners, or otherwise, which is the most valu- 
able part. If the whole convoy cannot be car- 
ried off, take this part away and burn the rest. 
If there be no time to do this, pillage the whole, 
or else destroy it. 



FORAGING. 

1. The expense of transporting the vast 
quantity of forage required for the daily use of 
the animals accompanying an army is so enor- 
mous, that the chief reliance for this kind of 
supplies must be on the country through which 
the army is marching. In the enemy's coun- 
try, therefore, foraging is a necessary opera- 
tion in war ; and it causes less distress to the 
inhabitants than the taking of subsistence for 
men. 

2. Foraging is a well established right of 
war ; but it should not be resorted to when the 
object can be accomplished by a requisition on 
the civil authorities. 

3. If our foragers are killed by the enemy in 
cold blood, retaliation may be necessary for 
future protection. But we are bound to prevent, 
by every means in our power, the commission 
of any excesses by our foragers. The honor of 
the nation requires that all acts of outrage and 
insult committed by its troops upon inoffensive 

10* 



116 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

citizens in the enemy's country, or of wanton 
and unnecessary destruction of private prop- 
erty, should be punished with the utmost severity. 

4. Never send out a foraging party till the 
country around has been reconnoitred, to ascer- 
tain, both in what places the forage may be 
obtained, and whether the enemy is present in 
such force as to make the foraging dangerous or 
impracticable. 

5. A foraging party should always be accom- 
panied by an escort, which should keep out an 
advance guard. 

6. If the foraging ground be distant from our 
camp, it will be prudent to post a special 
detachment in support, about half way. 

7. Before the foraging begins, trustworthy 
troops should be posted in the villages or ham- 
lets around, to prevent pillage. 

8. One or more staff officers should always 
be sent with a foraging party, to see that orders 
are properly executed, and to report irregulari- 
ties. 

9. To prevent pillage, it is better not to take 
a foraging party into a village. In order, if 
possible, to avoid this, a demand should first be 
made outside for the amount of forage required. 



FORAGING. 117 

10. If a town or village has to be entered, 
certain houses should be assigned to certain com- 
panies; each one being made responsible for 
the proper conduct of the foraging in its own 
section. If any company, or other corps, pil- 
lages, due compensation should be made to the 
parties pillaged, and the amount deducted from 
the pay and allowances of the pillaging corps. 

Post guards, and send patrols to arrest fora- 
gers guilty of disorder. 

11. Foraging officers should make their levies 
with as much equality as possible, and with due 
moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept 
of everything taken, so that it may be properly 
distributed and accounted for. 

12. Even when it is not supposed that any 
compensation will ever be paid, it is well to 
offer to the owners, certificates of their property 
having been taken for the use of the army. 

13. On arriving at the foraging ground, the 
escort will be posted in such a manner as will 
best cover the foraging ; keeping a reserve, con- 
cealed, if possible, at some central point. 

To Attaclc Foragers, 

14. To attack a party engaged in foraging, 
we charge with our whole force, and capture or 



118 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

disperse its escort But if a portion only of 
our own forc3 will suffice for this, we divide it 
into two detachments, one of which attacks the 
escort, while the other throws itself upon the 
foragers, compelling them to desist from their 
work ; capturing or destroying the forage 
already collected, and taking the foragers pris- 
oners. 

Further than this, no fixed rules can be given 
for the attack or for the defence of foragers while 
engaged in foraging ; since the proper mode of 
conducting either will depend on the special 
circumstances of the case, which must con- 
stantlv vary. 

15. A foraging party returning with forage 
is a species of convoy. For the attack or 
defence of such a party, therefore, the general 
principles already laid down for the attack or 
defense of a convoy will be applicable. 



RECONNAISSANCES 

will be treated of under three heads : 
I. Objects of a Reconnaissance. 
II. How Made. 
III. Offensive Patrols. 

I. OBJECTS OF A RECONNAISSANCE. 

Reconnaissances are of three kinds : 
1. Topographical ; which are made for the 
purpose of obtaining accurate knowledge of the 
face of the country, the various routes of com- 
munication, the military positions to be found 
on or near them, the situation and relative dis- 
tances of towns and villages, mountain heights 
and ridges, the course of streams and the best 
points for crossing them, and various other par- 
ticulars ; without some knowledge of which no 
army can successfully, or even safely, operate 
in an enemy's country. 

The practical details of this kind of recon- 
naissances are so numerous, and vary so much 
with circumstances, as to be out of place in a 



120 FIELD SERVICE IN WAK. 

summary of general principles. They belong 
to the sphere of staff duty, and require a special 
study. 

The following plan was adopted by General 
Rosecrans when in command of the Army of 
the Mississippi, for obtaining an accurate knowl- 
edge of the country. 

From the best geographical map to be found, 
a large skeleton map was prepared. This, after 
being filled in, so far as practicable, from infor- 
mation obtained from scouts, spies, deserters, 
prisoners, and citizens, was then photographed, 
and copies of it were distributed among the 
subordinate commanders, w T ith instructions to 
correct and complete. For this purpose, a topo- 
graphical officer was attached to each brigade. 
This system was afterwards carried to great per- 
fection in the Army of the Cumberland, and 
proved of the greatest utility. 

2. Reconnaissances having some special object ; 
as, to ascertain whether the enemy holds pos- 
session of a certain defile or village. These 
require no special discussion * 

3. The enemy being enveloped in a cloud of 
outposts, we must pierce it to know his position 

*See " Conduct of Special Detachments," in The Special Oper- 
ations of War." 



"RECONNAISSANCE, — HOW MADE. 121 

and force. This is the object of the third and 
most common kind of reconnaissances, which is 
the one now treated of 

4. In respect to this last kind, the important 
points are ; 

(1). The enemy's numbers, and where and 
how posted. 

(2). The key points of his position ; and in 
this connection, the points occupied by batte- 
ries, and those entrenched. 

(3). His distance from our own position. 

(4). The nature of the ground between us 
and the enemy ; whether passable, and for what 
arms. 

(5). The approaches to his position in 
front, flank and rear. 

(6). The avenues by which the enemy may 
approach our own position^ in front, flank and 
rear. 

II. HOW MADE. 

1. The best time for reconnoitring the enemy 
is at early dawn, when most troops stand to 
their arms ; it being then that their position 
and strength can be most clearly seen. 

2. When practicable, reconnaissances are 
made secretly. When this is not practicable, 



122 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

we must resort to an open, or what is sometimes 
called, an armed or a forced reconnaissance* 
This is done sometimes by sending forward skir- 
mishers to attack the enemy ; and sometimes 
by pushing a force inside of his lines ; thereby 
making him deploy his masses, and thus show 
his strength and position. 

3. When our reconnaissance is directed against 
a particular part of the enemy's position, we 
may threaten other points of his line at the 
same time ; thus effecting a diversio7i, and at 
the same time compelling him to exhibit his 
whole force. 

4. An open reconnaissance in force is always 
made at the risk of bringing on a geneiml en- 
gagement ; and the object in view may be so 
important as to justify this risk. Therefore, 
while such a reconnaissance is being made, our 
whole army should be drawn up, ready, not only 
to support the reconnoitring corps, but to profit 
by any opportunity that may offer to win a vic- 
tory. 

5. Secret reconnaissances are usually made 
by an engineer or other staff officer, with an 
escort of a few men. 

6. The most effectual mode of making a 
secret reconnaissance is by a single person, who 



RECONNAISSANCE. — HOW MADE. 123 

can move about and station himself unseen 
where the smallest patrol would probably attract 
attention. 

During the Peninsular War, it was a custom in 
the British army for a single mounted officer to 
hover for days around the enemy, and watch 
the direction of his march. On one occasion, a 
cavalry captain, thus employed, discovered that 
the French had not left their sick or their stores 
at Celerico ; showing that they had adopted a 
different line of operations from the one ostensi- 
bly taken ; a point which it was of the greatest 
importance to Wellington to ascertain. 

7. A secret reconnoitring party starts at dusk, 
or during the night, in order the more surely to 
conceal its march. 

, 8. Whenever it is expected that the recon- 
noitring party may be pursued, detachments 
should be stationed along the road, ready to 
cover its retreat. 

9. If a reconnoitring party of cavalry will 
have to return through a defile, some infantry 
should be sent forward to occupy and hold the 
defile as long as may be needed. On the other 
hand, whenever the escort consists of infantry, 
some horsemen should be sent with it to con- 
vey intelligence rapidly to the rear. 

11 



124 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

10. The reconnoitring officer should have with 
him a reliable guide, and should take with him 
a pocket telescope, and, when circumstances 
would make it useful, a topographical map of 
the country around. He should obtain all the 
information he can before starting relative to 
the route he is to pursue, and to the object of 
his mission. 

11. On arriving at the point from which the 
reconnaissance is to be made, the escort may 
be divided into two or three sections, eche- 
lonned along the road, and hidden from view ; 
the worst mounted one being in the rear. The 
reconnoitring officer may then advance with 
two or three well mounted men, and make his 
reconnaissance. 

If he is seen by the enemy and pursued, he 
will rejoin the most advanced echelon ; which, 
by showing itself suddenly, will probably induce 
the pursuers to halt, for fear of an ambuscade. 
This echelon may then fall back on the one 
next in rear, and the latter one on the third. 
These successive appearances of troops would 
be apt to make the enemy hesitate, and thus 
give time to the whole party to escape. 



OFFENSIVE PATROLS. 125 

III. OFFENSIVE PATROLS 

1. Is the name given to ordinary patrols when 
pushed forward for reconnoitring purposes ; to 
distinguish them from those whose chief object 
is the security of the troops in march, or 
in camp. They usually consist of a few 
men only ; but when used offensively, their 
strength is increased to a platoon, or to one or 
more companies, in order that they may be 
able to capture small posts and bring in pris- 
oners. 

2. The patrol commander should note all the 
ground he passes over; especially points favor- 
able to his defence, or which might endanger 
his retreat, should he be driven back ; and, how- 
ever small his command, should have out an 
advance guard, a rear guard, and flankers ; for 
his patrol is of such a strength that it is liable 
to attract the enemy's notice and invite attack. 

3. He should use the utmost circumspection 
in approaching ground favorable for ambus- 
cade ; as a defile, a wood, a ravine, a village, a 
farm house, or an enclosure. He should halt 
the main body out of musket range, or else 
under cover, and send a few picked men for- 
ward, one after the other, to examine; but 
keeping within each other's sight. He should 



126 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

approach the crest of an. eminence in the same 
manner as the apex of an Advance Guard ; a 
single man first creeping up cautiously to look 
over the top. 

On the route, the party should keep on the 
lookout for tracks, whether of men, animals, or 
carriage wheels. 

4. If the point to be examined is at a dis- 
tance from one of the flanks, the main body of 
the patrol is halted till a report ; or, if it move 
on, it should leave two or three men to bring 
up the report. 

5. At night, all precautions are redoubled: 
Signals, addressed to both the eye and the ear, 
are fixed upon, in case of separation. The pa- 
trol attends to everything that passes ; the 
barking of dogs, or other noises • fires, 
smoke, &c. 

6. If the enemy is seen in any force, the com- 
mand is halted out of his sight ; measures are 
taken against surprise ; and the commander 
goes with a few picked men to reconnoitre. 

7. On seeing the enemy in not too great 
force, the patrol attacks suddenly, and makes 
prisoners ; from whom important information is 
often derived. Indeed, no opportunity of cap- 
turing prisoners should ever be lost ; for, from 



OFFENSIVE PATROLS. 127 

the information extracted from them, even when 
it extends no farther than the names of the 
enemy's commanders, we may often be able to 
ascertain the location of particular corps, and 
guess pretty nearly the strength of his force in 
our front. 

In the Confederates' fierce assault on our 
right at Fort Donelson, the prisoners we cap- 
tured had their knapsacks and haversack. % 
"Are their haversacks filled?" asked Grant. 
* Yes, with three days rations" he was answered. 
" Then" he exclaimed, " they mean to cut their 
way out, and have no idea o£ staying here to 
fight us. Whichever party attacks now will 
whip." And he immediately gave orders for 
the advance of our left under General C. F 
Smith, which led to the surrender of the fort 
with its garrison of 15,000 men. 

8. In every war, the want of constant and 
faithful reconnaissances has led to disastrous 
results. One case may suffice as an example. 

For two days after Wellington's victory over 
the French at Busaco in the Peninsular War, he 
had no information of their movements. But 
the French were meanwhile secret! v making a 
flank march through a mountain path by 
their right to the plain of Coirnbra, which 
11* 



128 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

led directly upon Wellington's rear, and to Lis- 
bon. This forced the English army to fall back 
precipitately to its lines of Torres Vedras : 
thus losing, in two days, the fruits of its victory, 
and leaving all Portugal open to the invaders. 



NOTES ON LOGISTICS. 

Logistics is the art of supplying and moving 
an army in the field. 

As all strategic movements are necessarily 
dependent upon a sufficiency of supplies and of 
transportation, the subject is second in impor- 
tance only to Strategy itself. 

The topics treated of in these Notes will be 

I. As to Supplies Generally. 
II. Magazines. 

III. Transportation. 

IV. Reduction of Transportation. 

I. AS TO SUPPLIES GENERALLY. 

1. The term, supplies, includes subsistence 
for men, forage for animals, ammunition, hospi- 
tal stores, and everything else that an army 
must be constantly consuming. 

2. Before the campaign begins, the General 
Commanding should acquaint himself with the 
resources of the cowiiry he is to operate in ; so 
as'to be able to determine what amount of sup- 



130 FIEJ.D SERVICE IN WAR. 

plies the army can obtain from the country 
itself, and what amount it must take along 
with it. 

3. The people of every civilized country 
always have a surplus, more or less consider- 
able, of provisions on hand for future use. It 
was tersely replied by General Sherman, when 
asked how his army was to exist in the enemy's 
country, " Where millions of Georgians live, my 
men cannot starve " and again ; (" Where other 
people live, we can ; even if they have to starve, 
or move away." The two elements in the cal- 
culation of the amount the troops will find in 
any particular district are First, the number of 
inhabitants, and Secondly, the fertility of the 
soil, and the extent to which it is under cultiva- 
tion. 

4. The greater the population, the larger will 
obviously be the amount of surplus provisions 
that may be appropriated ; and vice versa. 

In very thinly inhabited countries, therefore* 
this source of supply cannot be relied on ; mil- 
itary operations will be comparatively clogged, 
and easy communications become of the greatest 
consequence. So that, in such a country, a line 
of communication crossing mountain ridges, or 
streams liable to be swollen, is to be avoided. 



LOGISTICS. OF SUPPLIES GENERALLY. 131 

5. But though there may be a surplus of sup- 
plies on hand sufficient for an army marching 
through a district, this may not suffice where 
the army is to remain, or to make long halts in 
it ; for the amount consumed each day by an 
army of any considerable strength is enormous, 
and will soon exhaust even the largest surplus. 
In such case, therefore, the army must 'keep 
open a communication with some secure base, 
in order to be supplied from it when the sur- 
plus provisions of the district are exhausted. 

6. As to the other element : It is obvious that 
the more fertile the soil, and the greater the 
extent of it that is under cultivation, the larger 
will be the amount of surplus supplies that the 
inhabitants may reasonably be supposed to have 
on hand. 

7/ It is on account, chiefly, of the greater 
facility and certainty in obtaining the necessary 
subsistence that a large army usually marches 
in several columns, by different parallel routes ; 
sometimes, even, when this may carry them 
beyond supporting distance from each other, 
and so expose them to defeat. 

8. An army operating for any considerable 
time in an enemy's country must draw from it 
a large portion, at least, of its daily supplies and 



132 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR, 

means of transportation. There are several 
modes in which these supplies may be obtained : 

(1). By purchase from the inhabitants with 
its own funds. 

(2). By imposing money contributions on 
the people through their governmental or mu- 
nicipal authorities, and purchasing the supplies 
from the inhabitants with the moneys thus 
levied. 

(3 ). By allowing the troops to subsist them- 
selves. 

(4). By requisitions in kind. 
9. As to purchasing them with our funds : 
Purchasing our supplies from the inhabitants 
at fair rates would be certainly attended with 
these advantages, that it would preserve the 
discipline of our troops, and would tend also to 
make partisans for us among the people. 

But to this method there are two insuperable 
objections : 

(1). It is in the highest degree uncertain; 
leaving the subsistence, and therefore the very 
existence of the army at the mercy of the 
enemy. Either from the hostility of the inhab- 
itants, or from compulsion by their authorities, 
they would often fail to bring the supplies called 
for. 



LOGISTICS. — OF SUPPLIES GENERALLY. 133 

(2). Even if the supplies could always be 
obtained by purchase, the expenses attendant 
upon the subsistence of a large army in the field 
and the necessary transportation for it are so 
enormous that, if kept up for any length of 
time, and borne exclusively by the government 
to which the army belongs, they would exhaust 
its finances ; and then the war would have to 
be given up for want of means to carry it on. 

For these reasons, Napoleon's system, which 
was to " make war support war," seems to be 
the only practicable one ; at least, where the 
war is of any considerable importance or dura- 
tion. 

10. Where the war is waged to suppress a 
rebellion, it is a mistaken policy on the part of 
the government to abstain from adopting, in the 
rebel districts, from the very first, the system of 
compulsory supplies. Till this is done, it can- 
not reasonably expect any important successes 
in the field, however brave and numerous may 
be its armies, and however skilfully they may be 
handled; so much do these successes depend 
upon ample supplies and means of transporta- 
tion. A people in rebellion are surely not enti- 
tled to any more consideration than the inhabi- 
tants of any other enemy's country. And even 



134 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

if they were, the system of forced supplies, by 
greatly facilitating military operations and mat- 
ing them far more effective, would tend to 
shorten the war and lead to peace ; which alone 
can bring them permanent relief. If the prop- 
erty of loyal citizens may thus be sometimes 
taken, this may be remedied by requiring 
receipts to be in all cases given to the owners 
when the supplies are taken ; at the close of the 
war, loyal owners to receive reimbursement from 
the nation. 

11. As to money contributions : 

This is an excellent method of enabling us to 
obtain supplies, when practicable ; for it is sub- 
stantially a tax, falling, like most other taxes, on 
the rich rather than on the poor. And if it be 
announced, at the same time, that all supplies 
brought in will be paid for in ready money, the 
effect must be more conciliatory on the mass of 
the population than any other mode of extort- 
ing supplies from them that could be devised. 
But it is obvious that opportunities for these 
contributions would often be wanting; and that, 
however eligible this method may be as an auxil- 
iary to other modes of obtaining supplies from 
the people of the country, it cannot be relied 



LOGISTICS. — OF SUPPLIES GENERALLY. 135 

upon as a sole, or even as a principal means for 
that purpose. 

12. The worst possible mode is that of leav- 
ing the troops to subsist themselves ; for this 
leads 

(1). To an entire relaxation of discipline, 
without which a military force is only an 
armed mob. 

(2). To universal pillage, and to murders 
and other outrages by the troops upon the in- 
habitants, which alwavs follow in its train. 

(3). To the consequent massacre of strag- 
gling parties, in retaliation, by the inhabitants, 
who are thus made bitter enemies. 

(4). To an enormous waste and destruction 
of the supplies themselves over and above what 
is actually consumed ; supplies of which the 
army itself may soon afterwards have most 
urgent need. This was exemplified in Napoleon's 
Russian Campaign, where this system was to a 
great extent permitted. One principal cause 
of the disorganization and awful disasters of 
the retreat from Moscow was the wanton destruc- 
tion, by the French advance columns, of immense 
quantities of provisions along the route, which 
would have amply sufficed for the subsistence of 
the entire army; in consequence of which, 
12 



136 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

thousands of French soldiers perished of star- 
vation. 

13. The best and .most reliable mode of 
obtaining supplies in the enemy's country 
appears to be by requisitions in kind on the 
local authorities ; the method usually practised 
by Napoleon in the Peninsular War. 

One advantage of this system over that of 
relying upon magazines in our rear is, that it 
will enable us to abandon our own line of ope- 
rations for the purpose of seizing upon the ene- 
my's, or for any other important object. In the 
Peninsular War, Napoleon sometimes put this 
system to direct strategic use. He would send 
to order so many thousand rations to be in read- 
iness at a particular place on a certain specified 
day, or at certain specified times at a series of 
places along a certain route, different from the 
one he really intended to take ; by this means 
blinding the enemy to his movements, and thus 
gaining one or more marches upon him. 

14. But in a very sparsely settled country, 
like most of the Southern and Southwestern 
districts of the United States, supplies are too. 
scarce to allow of any reliance on the system of 
requisitions. Unless, therefore, in our cam- 
paigns in those districts during the late war, our 



LOGISTICS.— OF SUPPLIES -GENERALLY. 137 

supply transportation was to be so vastly 
increased, as to render our columns mere inert 
masses, some other methods of subsisting our r 
armies had to be resorted to. 

In General Grant's march through Missis- 
sippi in his Vicksburg campaign, parties were, 
continually sent out, by night and by day,on each 
side of the main column, which searched houses 
and barns, and flour mills ; seizing all the ani- 
mals that came in their way. Some of these 
parties, when without commissioned officers, 
were occasionally guilty of excesses ; but the 
march was too rapid to admit of much pillaging. 
In twenty days after crossing the Mississippi, 
Grant had marched two hundred miles, beaten 
the enemy in five battles, killing, disabling or 
capturing some 12,000 of them, taken twenty- 
seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field guns, 
w r on important strategic advantages, and 
invested Vicksburg. Yet his troops began the 
march with only two days rations, carried in 
their haversacks, and only five days' rations 
were afterwards issued; the columns subsisting 
chiefly by the supplies thus picked up on the 
road; for the transport of which, wagons 
enough were also found and appropriated. 

And in regard to transportation, in Sherman's - 
march through Georgia in 1864, he authorized 



138 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

his cavalry and artillery to appropriate all 
horses, mules and wagons belonging to the in- 
habitants freely, and without limit ; but discrimi- 
nating between the rich, who were generally 
hostile to us, and the poor and industrious, who 
were usually friendly, or at least neutral. 

During General Sherman's march through 
Georgia in 1864, his army was subsisted by an 
excellent system of foraging. Each brigade 
had its regularly organized foraging party under 
discreet officers, which gathered along the route 
supplies of meat, vegetables, meal, corn, and 
forage sufficient for its own brigade ; at least 
ten days' subsistence for the troops and three 
days' forage being kept at all times in the wagon 
trains. During a halt, the soldiers were allowed 
to gather vegetables and drive in stock found 
close to their camps, but all other foraging was 
confined to the regular foraging parties ; and 
these were ordered to refrain from abusive or 
threatening language, and when possible, to 
leave with each family a reasonable portion for 
their maintenance ; a certificate of the facts 
being given to the owners whenever the officer 
in command should deem it proper. 

The operations of the so-called " bummers" 
or straggling marauders, in Sherman's march 



LOGISTICS.— OF SUPPLIES GENEBALLY. 139 

through Georgia and the Carolinas, had no con- 
nection with any organized corps. The volun- 
tary employment of these bands of pillagers, 
or a connivance at their doings, would have set 
the moral sentiment of the civilized world at defi- 
ance ; for, by the Articles of War governing 
every civilized army, marauding is a crime pun- 
ishable with death. The toleration of these 
marauders may be apologised for, but not 
defended ; and the only apology admissible is, 
that it was unavoidable. Straggling is an evil 
which always exists, to a greater or less extent, 
among even the best disciplined regular troops. 
It is therefore not surprising that a large volun- 
teer army of Western men, born and brought up 
in all the individual freedom of frontiersmen, 
should have had its thousands of reckless soldiers 
who could not be made to keep with their col- 
ors ; since, in the march through the enemy's 
country, there was obviously neither time nor 
force to spare to pursue, arrest and bring 
them in. Had all the regiments of that army 
been subjected, before taking the field, to a long 
course of discipline in camp or in garrison, the 
evil would have been in great measure pre- 
vented; but the exigencies of the war ren- 
dered this impossible. 
12* 



140 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

II. MAGAZINES. 

1. Whether the plan of subsisting on the 
enemy be adopted or not, an army should always 
have a reserve of supplies on hand for an un- 
expected march, or other emergency. Depots 
of supplies, or magazines, are not only useful, 
but to a greater or less extent, necessary. In 
barren districts, an army without magazines 
would be in great danger of destruction. And 
even in fertile and populous ones, which may 
furnish enough of subsistence, we must rely on 
our own depots for supplies of ammunition, ord- 
nance, and warlike material. As to ammunition, 
a single great battle will generally use up all 
an army can carry with it. 

2. Magazines are either 

(1). Principal; at the base of operations. 

(2). Secondary; on the line of operations ; 
or 

(3). Provisional; in the immediate neigh- 
borhood of the troops, with supplies for a few 
days only. 

3. But we cannot safely rely on magazines 
exclusively. We must combine with them, the 
system of forced requisitions, or else that of a 
regulated foraging on the people of the coun- 
try ; else the army can have no celerity of 



LOGISTICS.— -MAGAZINES. 141 

movement. A reliance on magazines alone will 
fetter our movements, and render all our opera- 
tions subordinate to the means of supply 

4. Another inconvenience attending the de- 
pendence on magazines is that, as the move- 
ments of the army must be such as to cover 
them, they reveal to the enemy our plan of cam- 
paign. 

5. Magazines containing vast supplies of sub- 
sistence and material are dangerous- They ren- 
der the strategic movements of the army com- 
pletely dependent upon them, and, like large 
convoys, they invite attack ; when, if they are 
carried, all is lost. 

From disastrous experience in this respect, 
the Austrians, in 1809, gave up their system of 
vast depots in time of war. But they substi- 
tuted for these, ponderous, moveable magazines, 
accompanying their columns ; which rendered 
their movements so slow that the French easily 
outmarched them, and so, beat them as before. 

6. Napoleon said that at every five or six 
days' march, there should be a fort or entrenched 
position for a magazine of provisions and mili- 
tary stores, and the organization of convoys. In 
his last campaigns this system seems to have 
been, to a great extent, carried into practice. 



142 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Immediately on the troops arriving at the 
points designated for these depots, ovens were 
built for the baking of biscuit, ammmunition 
collected and stored, and hospitals organized. 

These depots along the route enabled those 
men of the marching columns who were ex- 
hausted, or temporarily indisposed, to halt for a 
few days and recruit, instead of forming an im- 
potent tail to the army, lengthening as it 
advanced. 

Another advantage of such depots echelonned 
along the route is that, if the army be forced to 
fall back, it will find reinforcements in their gar- 
risons, and means to refit in their stores. 

7. As to the location of depots for supplies : 
(1). They should be located in places that 
are either strong by nature, or made so by art ; 
so that they may be guarded by small garri- 
sons, and thus not reduce unnecessarily the 
force operating in the field. 

(2). They should be established on rivers, 
canals, roads, or railways, communicating with 
our line of operations ; so that the supplies may 
be transported with ease and rapidity as the 
army advances. 

(3). In a defensive war, they should never 
be in the first line of defence, which is always 



LOGISTICS. TKANSPOBTATION. 143 

liable to be suddenly forced ; especially where 
the line of defence is a river, which almost 
always, may be easily turned. 

4. In cantonments, they should be located at 
those places in rear which are fixed for the ren- 
dezvous of the respective army corps; so that 
§ach corps may have enough for a march of 
eight or ten days, on a sudden alarm. 

III. TRAXSPOKTATION. 

1. The quantity of transportation required 
by a large army engaged in active operations in 
the field is very great. In our service, the 
weight of one thousand rations, that is, one 
days' subsistence for one thousand men, packing 
included, is about 3,500 lbs. 

For an army of ten thousand men 

per day, 35,000 " 

For an army of one hundred thou- 
sand men, per day, 350,000 ? 
But there must be added to this a vast 
amount of transportation more, for infantry 
ammunition, each box of which, containing one 
thousand rounds, weighs about one hundred 
lbs. ; for artillery ammunition, hospital stores, 
quartermasters' and artificers' tools and mate- 
rials, other military stores, pontoon trains, sut- 



144 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

ler's stores, and sometimes, forage for cavalry, 
artillery, and draught horses, and baggage ani- 
mals. The number of these that must accom- 
pany a large army is enormous. In October, 
1862, McClellan's aggregate force, citizen em- 
ployees included, was 122 ; Q00 men. The? trans- 
portation for ten days' subsistence alone of this 
force was 1,830 wagons, and 1,098 pack ani- 
mals. Including 5,046 cavalry horses, 6,836 
artillery horses, and the wagon teams, the 
whole number of animals was 20,300. The 
transport of ten days' forage for these, required 
about 17,000 animals more. But to these ani- 
mals must be added those employed in trans- 
porting quartermaster's supplies, camp equipage, 
ambulances, reserve ammunition and baggage. 
In June previous, in the same General's retreat 
to Harrison's Landing with about 100,000 men, 
his carriages and teams, if marching on a single 
road, would have extended about forty miles. 
And, in the first years of our late war, the quar- 
termaster's trains alone in our armies averaged 
one wa^on to every twenty-four men. 

As to animals, for an army in the field com- 
pletely equipped, including what is needed for 
cavalry, artillery and trains, the proportion 
usually estimated is one horse or mule to every 



LOGISTICS. TRANSPORTATION. 145 

two men. This would give a total of 50,000 
for an army of 100,000 men. In Grant's Vir- 
ginia campaign in 1864, the proportion was 
somewhat less than this ; but in Sherman's At- 
lanta campaign, it was considerably more. 

2. We may here suggest that the enormous 
number' of draught animals required in our ser- 
vice could be considerably reduced by substi- 
tuting light drays for the high and heavy wag- 
ons we have been heretofore using ; each of 
which, over bad roads, requires from four to six 
mules to drag its weight alone. Another impor- 
tant advantage of these drays would be that they 
are much sooner loaded and unloaded. 

3. It is obvious that a single road for the 
entire supply of a large army would not suffice, 
as it must soon become choked. Therefore, 
when its line of supply is not a railway, such an 
army, as it advances, must either cut additional 
roads behind it when they do not already exist, 
or rely, as did Grant's army on its march 
through Mississippi in 1863, for its daily sup- 
plies, chiefly on the enemy's country. 

4. In view of all this, it is not surprising that 
transportation constitutes one of the greatest 
difficulties an army commander has to contend 
with, and one which may, at any time, cause the 



146 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

failure of a campaign planned and conducted by 
the greatest military genius, wielding the most 
numerous and well disciplined army. Napo- 
leon insisted that the chief cause of the disas- 
ters of the Grand Army in its retreat from Mos- 
cow was the sudden cold of which 30,000 of his 
horses perished in one night; thus compelling 
him to leave behind, for want of transpor- 
tation, a large j3art of his artillery and of his 
supplies. 

The amount of supplies and of warlike mate- 
rial of every kind that was destroyed by the 
troops on both sides in our late war, for want of 
transportation, is absolutely incalculable ; sup- 
plies, too, often most urgently needed by the 
troops destroying them. 

5. It is easy to perceive that by far the greater 
part of the cost of military operations consists 
not in the mere subsistence, or in the pay of the 
troops, but in the expense of the necessary 
transportation : as for instance, in the case of 
the late Abyssinian campaign by a small British 
force, the cost of which is now said to foot up, 
at the very least, £10,000,000 sterling, or $50,- 
000,000 in gold. 

G. Such being the importance of facilities for 
transportation in military operations, it is obvi- 



LOGISTICS. TRANSPORTATION. 147 

ous that railways, by their easy, rapid, and 
cheap conveyance of supplies and of troops, 
furnish the most powerful asssistance in war. 
This was first seen in the last Italian war, in 
which the means of transportation possessed by 
the Allies gave them a decided advantage over 
the Austrians. And, in our own late war, rail- 
ways not only caused an immense saving of ex- 
pense in the transportation of supplies, but 
sometimes enabled marches to be made, and 
strategic operations to be undertaken and suc- 
cessfully accomplished of which military his- 
tory had as yet furnished no example. The 
troops of General Sherman, for instance, in his 
Georgia campaign, had no sooner established 
their bivouacs, than the whistle of the locomo- 
tive announced the arrival of their supplies. 

In future wars, therefore, lines of operation 
must usually coincide with the principal rail- 
ways. This will go very far to simplify the 
strategic problems presented, both in offensive 
and defensive war ; since, by reducing the num- 
ber of combinations from which we are to choose, 
it renders the choice easier ; and, at the same 
time, it enables us to anticipate with more or 
less certainty, what will be the lines of operar 
tkm of the enemy. 
13 



148 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

The following is an extract from a letter 
addressed to the author by General Hermann 
Haupt, the distinguished Superintendent of 
Railways during the campaigns in Virginia, in 
answer to inquiries touching the capacity of 
railways for the transportation of troops : 

"I regret that I have no notes or documents 
in my possession by which I can answer when 
and where the greatest number of troops were 
concentrated at a given point by rail in twenty- 
four hours. During the second battle of Bull 
Run we threw into the field 10.000 men per 
day, when they were offered for transportation; 
but this does not measure the capacity of a rail- 
road. The difficulty is in getting the men 
loaded in proper time and manner, and in avoid- 
ing the delays incident to military interference 
with train arrangements. Even after my au- 
thority over the railroads had, by a general order, 
been declared "supreme," and officers of every 
rank forbidden to interfere with my arrange- 
ments, officers would, nevertheless, sometimes 
trifle and interfere to such an extent that more 
time was lost in getting troops into the cars 
than in transporting them when in. 

A rough estimate of the capacity of a double 
track railroad, fully equipped with cars and en- 



LOGISTICS.— TRANSPORTATION. 149 

gines, can be readily made. Allow trains of 
twenty cars to start at intervals of fifteen min- 
utes, each car carrying fifty men. Ninety-six 
thousand men could be moved in twenty-four 
hours to a distance of two hundred and fifty 
miles. The number moved and the distance 
travelled per day are simply questions of equip- 
ment and celerity of handling. Some ColoneR 
could get a regiment into the cars in ten min- 
utes ; others would waste half a day, and 
derange the whole line. 

" The capacity of a single track railroad is 
very much less than that of a double track, and 
may vary from nothing to three thousand tons 
per day, according to the greater or less degree 
of military interference. When officers were 
allowed to monopolize the telegraph lines, and 
give orders to conductors of trains in conflict 
with those received from the Superintendent, a 
blockade invariably occurred, and it has hap- 
pened that for days not a wheel could move. 
When the train dispatcher had the free use of 
the telegraph, and the Superintendent the 
control of the trains, three hundred cars or more 
per day have been sent forward with supplies 
equivalent to the capacity of three thousand 
wagons. This was done on the Orange and 



150 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

Alexandria Railroad. During the battle of Get- 
tysburg, thirty trains per day were sent over 
the single track Western Maryland Railroad, 
which was equipped only for two trains per day ; 
the deficiency of wood was supplied by bring- 
ing it ready cut from Alexandria, and water 
was dipped from ditches on the road side. 

" You will perceive how difficult it is to esti- 
mate the capacity of a railroad for moving 
troops, since everything depends upon the man- 
agement ; but well managed, they are invalu- 
able. In the operations against Lee, in Vir- 
ginia, track was sometimes laid, including gra- 
ding, at the rate of a mile per day, and cars run 
to the headquarters of the different corps in 
their encampments. 

" A retreating army aided by a railroad can 
always escape from its pursuers. One has the 
use of the road and equipment, the other must 
rebuild bridges and repair track as it pro- 
ceeds. 

" It is almost impossible to protect an extended 
line of railroad. A single man, provided with 
an augur and torpedoes,such as I had constructed 
during the operations in Virginia, could blow 
down any bridge of ordinary construction in five 
minutes. To guard every vulnerable point on an 



LOGISTICS — REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION. 151 

extended line, would require a very large 
force, as small detachmeuts could be readily cap- 
tured by a roving force, and a line broken at a 
single point becomes useless." 

IV. REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION. 

1. Rapid marching is the most important ele- 
ment in the execution of strategic plans ; so 
that the success of military operations depends, 
in great measure, upon the extent to which the 
army is stripped of its impedimenta, especially 
wheel carriages. We will now indicate the 
principal means of reducing transportation to 
its lowest possible minimum. 

2. Field tents for the command generally, 
should not be allowed. 

The field tents for one regiment alone require 
twenty wagons to transport them; and beside 
these wagons themselves must be reckoned the 
transportation often required for the forage of 
the animals which draw them. It is moreover 
to be observed, that field tents disclose to the 
enemy both our numbers and our position ; 
that, since the introduction of the shelter tents 
carried by the men, they are no longer needed ; 
and that experience has shown the superior 
healthiness of camping without them. The 
12* 



152 FIELD SEEVICE IN WAR. 

injurious effects of wet and cold are in a great 
degree obviated by making the men sleep in 
circles round their bivouac fires, with their feet 
close to the fire. 

Nevertheless, as maps and official records and 
papers must be kept sheltered from the weather, 
one tent should be allowed for this pupose to 
each regiment, and one or more tents to each 
general officer, according to the extent of his 
command. 

3. On the march, the tendency is invariably 
towards an increase of baggage. The cardinal 
rule, that the baggage must be reduced and 
kept down to the small. practicable limit, should 
be in all cases rigidly Enforced, without regard 
to official rank. In every great war we find ex- 
amples of defeat caused by the want of a 
strict enforcement of this rule. As to this, our 
own late war i§ no exception; as, witness the 
disaster caused at Sabine Cross Roads by the 
enormous bag^a^e train that was suffered to fol- 
low our leading cavalrv brigade ; a disaster 
which lost us the campaign. To guard against 
this evil, is one of the most difficult tasks that 
devolve upon the General Commanding; one 
often requiring the exercise of an iron will. 
The commander should never hesitate, when 



LOGISTICS REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION. 153 

occasion requires, to prohibit all baggage not 
absolutely indispensable, though, by so doing, 
he may sacrifice his own personal ease and com" 
fort, as well as that of his officers and men. 

A cheerful compliance of the entire command 
with whatever may be ordered on this head 
may always be relied on, whenever the General 
Commanding is seen sharing in the privations 
of the common soldier ; as was strikingly exem- 
plified in Sherman's marches from Chattanooga 
to Goldsboro. In the Atlanta campaign, our 
troops marched so lightly that the officers were 
seen with knapsacks ; and the men, besides their 
ordinary burthen, carried also spades, picks, cof- 
fee pots, and kettles ; a contrast, indeed, to our 
lumbering marches of 1801 and 1862. In the 
march through the Carolinas, no wall tents were 
allow r ed ; only a few tent flies being permitted 
for the shelter of staff books and papers ; and 
no trunks, camp cots, or chairs whatever ; no 
exception being made in favor of the Com- 
mander himself. 

4. As to the carriage of subsistence : 

(1). When railway transportation can be 
had, it should be used for dead freight exclu- 
sively. Live cattle should always be driven. 
(2). In case of emergency, subsistence for 
ten days, at least, in our service, may be made 



154 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

to suffice for twenty days ; as the men will be 
able to live on half rations during that period, 
usually without any serious loss of strength. 

(3.) It is only the surplus over and above 
what we are able to pack on our baggage ani- 
mals that should be placed in the wagons. 

(4). When the country through which we 
are to inarch may be depended upon for meat, 
and flour or meal, the only supplies we need 
take along with us are coffee, sugar, and salt, 
or even coffee and salt alone. To these must 
be added hard bread, when flour or meal cannot 
be relied upon. 

(5). Transportation maybe also reduced by 
directing the officers to live on the army ration. 

(6). We may further dimmish the amount of 
subsistence to be carried, by directing the troops 
to halt and renew their supplies at such depots as 
may be on the route. And we may here observe 
that, in cases of emergency requiring great 
haste, the officer in charge of a subsistence depot 
would be justified in loading up the teams with 
rations and stores, without waiting for the mak- 
ing out of formal requisitions or provision 
returns. 

In our service, the men's haversacks will con- 
tain only three days' full rations. But Sher- 



LOGISTICS — REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION. 155 

man's army, in marching from Atlanta, carried 
in their haversacks subsistence enough for five 
days. Fifteen days' rations in addition were 
carried in the wagons. 

5. As to forage ; The cavalry men can carry 
two days' forage on the pommel of their sad- 
dles. 

For the conveyance of forage, all wagons and 
pack-horses found, whether belonging to friend 
or foe, may be pressed into the service, and left 
behind when no longer needed. 

6. When not actually needed for the sick or 
the wounded, ambulances may be used^s ammu- 
nition wagons. 

7. In operations through a densely wooded 
country, the use of many guns will be impracti- 
ble. This will enable us to effect a considerable 
reduction of transportation by dispensing with 
a large part of our artillery, together with the 
trains it requires. 

8. When we are short of transportation, we 
must use what we have for what is the most 
important ; that is, First, for ammunition. Sec- 
ondly, for clothing, especially shoes. Thirdly, 
for subsistence. Fourthly, for forage. But when 
the country will not supply us with provisions, 
subsistence will come before clothing in the or- 
der of relative importance. 



156 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

i 

9. A few examples, drawn from our late war, 
may perhaps serve still further to illustrate the 
.subject. 

In General A. J. Smith's Red River Expedi- 
tion, in March, 1863, Gen. Sherman allowed 
only two wagons to each regiment. In the 
same general's venturesome march from Atlanta 
to Savannah," he dispensed with general sup- 
ply trains altogether. In lieu of these, there 
followed behind each regiment one wagon and 
one ambulance ; and behind each brigade, a suf- 
ficient number of ammunition and provision 
wagons, and of ambulances. In case of danger, 
each army corps was to have its advance, and 
its rear brigade unincumbered by wheels. 

In General Rosecrans' march from Murfrees- 
boro to Chattanooga in 1863, General Sheridan 
stripped his division of everything not abso- 
lutely indispensable, and loaded the wagons and 
animals thus set free with supplies and with 
extra provender; so that, after a few days' 
march, when the supplies of all the other divi- 
sion were completely exhausted, his division 
had still ten days' forage and provisions on 
hand. 

In February, 1865, the same general marched 
with a cavalry force of 10,000 men from Win- 



LOGISTICS- — REDUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION. 157 

Chester up the Shenandoah Valley, with orders 
to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad, and 
the James River Canal, capture Lynchburg, if 
practicable, and then join Sherman in North 
Carolina. His command took with it five days' 
rations in haversacks, fifteen days' rations of 
coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, and thirty 
pounds of forage on each horse. One wagon 
was allowed to each division headquarters. Beside 
these, there were eight ambulances, and the 
ammunition and pontoon trains ; but no other 
vehicles were allowed. There was no lack of 
supplies during the expedition, and the trans- 
portation sufficed for all purposes. 

1$ July, 1864, during Sherman's Atlanta 
campaign^General Rousseau made an important 
and successful cavalry raid on Johnston's com- 
munications, from Decatur in Alabama. No 
vehicle whatever was taken except one ambu- 
lance for each regiment. The ammunition and 
camp utensils were packed on mules. In their 
haversacks, the men carried fifteen days' rations 
of coffee, salt, and sugar, five rations of hard 
bread, and one of bacon. A forage train of corn 
accompanied the column during the first day's 
march only, and then returned. The men were 
allowed no blankets, and no extra clothing but 



158 FIELD SERVICE IN WAR. 

one shirt and a pair of socks. But each man 
carried with him two extra horse shoes fitted to 
his horse, and nails enough to fasten them with ; 
an excellent precaution on the departure of a 
cavalry expedition. The command was out 
thirteen days, and lacked for nothing. 

In respect to the problem of supplies, Logis- 
tics and Strategy are always at swords' 
points. Logistics calls for a wide circle of ope- 
rations ; Strategy succeeds best with a restricted- 
one. Logistics demands many marching col- 
umns ; Strategy uses as few of them as possi- 
ble. The policy of Logistics is dispersion; 
that of Strategy, concentration. Of the two, 
Logistics is the more powerful ; since the phy- 
sical nature of things will bend neither to the 
will nor skill of man. 

THE EISTJD. 




For Sale, by the same Author, 

Tactical Use of the Three Arms. 
12 1110. Price $1.25. 

" Col. Lippitt lias prepared a well-written, terse, clear, 
intelligible, and very interesting treatise upon some tac- 
tical questions which have always been of importance 
since the introduction of gunpowder into the science of 
war, and the distribution of active field forces in three 
main arms. 

" A good idea of the system of the book may be gained 
from an account of the subjects it treats. The first is 
of the practical use of Infantry. This general head in- 
cludes, first, the whole topic of attacks, in general, in the 
formation, and in the manner of making them, with a dis- 
cussion of bayonet charges. 

"We next find considered the defences. of Infantry — 
against other Infantry, against Artillery, against Ca\alry, 
with some criticism upon all the defensive formations, 
but particularly upon squares. Next comes the subject of 
Skirmishers — their use, their positions, the handling of 
them, and the rules for individual skirmishers. 

" In the same lucid way, the practical use of Artillery 
is treated. First, there comes the posting of artillery, 
with respect to the ground, to our own troops, to the ene- 
my, and to the position of other pieces in the same bat- 
tery. Next, the use of Artillery in general — inoffensive 
combat; and defensive combat; against the three arms, 
severally. Lastly, its fire, and its supports. Upon Cav- 
alry, he divides his observations into its formations — its 
strong and its weak points ; the method of posting it : 
its supports ; how used ; how it fights ; its charge ; its at- 
tack on Infantry, both generally and on squares." — Army 
and Navy Journal. 



NOTICES. 

"The formation, the manner of use, and the general 
handling, are very practically presented, and we are glad 
to see that, while many of the illustrative examples 
are taken from the Napoleonic wars, our own war has 
not been neglected. We recommend this book for use as 
a simple, accurate, and brief manual in military institu- 
tions,and for instruction in militia organizations." — United 
States Service Magazine. 



" A great want has always been felt in military schools, 
in drill clubs, and in camps of instruction, of some brief 
manual which should show the relation borne to each 
other by the three arms, in combined operations. Col. 
Lippitt has admirably filled this need. Many an officer 
has come to grief, in actual service, for w T ant of that 
knowledge which this little volume would have given 
him." — Boston Commomvealth. 



State or Rhode Island, Executive Department,) 
Providence, Oct. 14, 1866. j 

My Dear Sir : Please accept my thanks for your book 
on the " Tactical Use of the Three Arms." I have looked 
over it with great interest, and take pleasure in saying 
that I regard it as a most useful work, and one destined 
to take a high stand in military literature. It would not 
surprise me to hear of its being adopted as a text book 
at West Point. Truly yours, 

(Signed) A. E. BURNSIDE. 

Gen. Francis J. Lippitt. 



LETTER FROM THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE. 

Horse Guards, 11th May, 1866. 
Sir : I have received through Mr. Hammond, of the 
Foreign Office, the copy of a work, entitled " Tactical 
Use of the Three Arms," by Col. Lippitt, late Second 
Infantry California Volunteers, w T hich you forwarded for 
my acceptance, and I have now therefore to request that 
you will be good enough to take an early opportunity of 



NOTICES. 

conveying to Col. Lippitt, through Mr. Sumner, the 
expression of my best thanks for his having presented 
to me so interesting and useful a book on the subject in 
which I naturally take very great interest. 
I am, sir, yours, 
(Signed) GEORGE. 

The Hon. Sir F. W. A. Bruce, G. C. B. 



- It is written in so concise, lucid, and entertaining a 
style, that while it is full of instruction to the professional 
student of the science and the art of Avar, it is also deeply 
interesting to the general reader." " The non-professional 
reader cannot but be struck with the wonderful conden- 
sation and terseness of the work, while the style is never 
bald or dry." — Providence Journal. 



Also for Sale, by the same Author, 

A Treatise on Intrenchments. 

12mo, pp. 146, Illustrated by 41 Plates, 

Price $1.50. 

" It is a brief but comprehensive statement of all that 
needs to be known upon the subject by any except pro- 
fessional engineers. All the principles of the art of field 
fortification are clearly explained, with copious illustra- 
tions drawn from military history, especially from the ope- 
rations of our late war ; the whole made plain by dia- 
grams. The problems are solved by the four rules of 
arithmetic, instead of by a resort, as heretofore, to flux- 
ions or the higher algebra; and in every respect the work 
is adapted to academic instruction, and the use of those 
who desire to obtain a clear comprehension of the gene- 
ral principles of engineering without the study required 
for a thorough understanding of the science in all its de- 
tails." — Army and Navy Journal, 



NOTICES, 

" This little book is such an excellent one that our only 
regret in welcoming it, is that it was not published in 
1861, instead of 1866. It contains instructions and sug- 
gestions that would have been of the utmost value to our 
intelligent officers of volunteers. 

"The technical terms which belong to the art of field 
fortification are clearly and briefly defined by the author 
in such a way that they readily fix themselves in the 
memory. The principles of the art are accurately 
laid down, and many illustrations of their application are 
drawn from the history of modern warfare, including the 
recent war of secession." 

"It is as a hand-book and aids-memoire that his book 
has substantial value. It is so simple that any intelligent 
man of fair education can master its contents with a mod- 
erate amount of study; and yet it seems to contain all 
that an officer whose command is not large enough for him 
to have an officer of engineers on his staff can almost 
ever need to know about intrenchments. 

" The chapters upon the attack and defence of intrench- 
ment are excellent in principle, and full of useful practi- 
cal suggestions. Like the other chapters, they are 
enlivened by 'modern instances.' The diagrams scat- 
tered through the work are sufficient in number, audwell 
suited to their purpose." — The Nation, 



" It embraces more useful military information than 
any book I ever read of the same si'zc." — Gen. Burnside. 



Also for Sale, by the same Author, 

The Special Operations of War. 

COMPRISING 

The forcing and Defence of Defiles. 
The forcing and Defence of Rivers, and the 
passage of Rivers in Retreat, 



NOTICES. 

The Attack axd Defence of open Towns and 
Villages. 

The Conduct of Detachments for Special Pur- 
poses, and 

Notes on Tactical Operations in Sieges. 

12mo, With Illustrative Cuts. Price $1-25. 

Extract from The Nation. 

" In a former number of the Nation we bore our testi- 
mony to the excellence of the "Treatise on Entrench- 
ments." What we said of that book might be repeated 
of this, but with additions, viz : that the subjects dis- 
cussed are judiciously chosen, and that the discussion ot 
each is well considered, well reasoned, and well put. 
There is not a word too much, and, we are inclined to 
think, not a word too little. Most of us hope that there 
will not be another war in America, during the present 
century at least, but there may be, and it is a wise maxim 
to prepare for war in time of peace. Our country now 
numbers many men in civil life to whom the art of war 
has become an interesting study, and our regular army, 
though not large, has a cadre large enough to include 
many officers who must desirfc to learn what they do not 
know, or to refresh their recollection of what they have 
learned and forgotten. To all such we cordially com- 
mend the book. They will find it thoroughly business- 
like. It is all to the point ; and yet the illustrations are 
so well chosen, and so generally taken either from our 
recent war or from Napoleon's campaigns, that it is as far 
as possible from being dull. The general reader with a 
taste for military subjects, will find it agreeable reading, 
and will be probably much interested to find how simple 
is the explanation of many of the successes and disasters 
of our war, and how directly traceable they were to the 
observance or violation of some well settled military 
principle. The author is eminently successful in per- 
ceiving the principles involved in actual operations, and 
he points the moral to be drawn from such of them as 
he refers to in a way that readily fixes it in the memory." 



NOTICES. 

From the Army and Navy Journal. 

" Gen. Lippitt has succeeded in making an interesting 
as well as an instructive book, lor he not only explains to 
the reader what is necessary to do when compelled to 
resort to one of the special operations of war for attack or 
defence, but shows what was done under similar circum- 
stances by the best generals in the war of the rebellion, 
and by Napoleon and other great captains. Diagrams 
are given wherever they are necessary to illustrate the 
text or can be used to advantage." 

From the London Saturday Review. 
" The directions given in each case are brief, clear, and 
intelligible, and the reasons for them are distinctly and 
correctly stated, with occasional references in which their 
value has been strikingly exemplified. The language is 
free from technicality, and the style terse, simple and 
direct-" 

From the United Service Gazette. 
We publish this week, and shall continue to do so as 
space may permit, some extracts from an exceedingly 
valuable little book, The Special Operations of War, by 
General F. J. Lippitt, of the United States service. The 
volume is full of practical hints, illustrated by well chosen 
instances from our own, French and American wars, and 
is one of high interest to our readers, for whom it pre- 
sents, in an easy popular style, a condensed amount of 
useful information, which it would necessitate long and 
laborious study of more pretentious works to acquire." 

The Boston Transcript calls it " a very interesting 
volume, clearly and intelligently written." 

Lieut. Col. J. Albert Monroe, late Chief of Artillery 
of the Ninth Corps, speaking of this and the other two 
treatises then published, writes as follows : 

Providence, R. L, May 18, 1868. 

" I cannot but regret that they were not issued in the 
earlyjpart of the late war, for their practical teachings 



NOTICES. 

and wholesome suggestions would have been of incalcu- 
lable value to both our volunteer and regular army." 

From the New York Tribune. 

" The Special Operations of War by Francis J. Lip- 
pitt, is the work of an officer in the U. S. Volunteer ser- 
vice, who has already gained honorable distinction as an 
author by his previous writings on different branches of 
military science. The present volume, among other 
topics, treats of the forcing and defence of defiles and 
rivers, the attack and defence of open towns and villages, 
the conduct of detachments for special purposes, and tac- 
tical operations in sieges. In the illustration of the 
principles set forth by the writer, he makes frequent and 
important use of the movements in the late war of the 
rebellion, as well as of operations in the wars of Napo- 
leon and other European campaigns. The work thus 
assumes in some sense, the character of a historical com- 
mentary on celebrated military actions, and becomes of 
interest to the general reader, as well as to the student 
of the art of war. It is recommended by the lucidity and 
terseness of its expositions, and the facility with which it 
seizes the essential point of a question, without burden- 
ing the discussion with superfluous details. The writer 
has evidently aimed at imparting useful information 
rather than at swelling the size of his book — an example 
of common sense which appeals to the common sense of 
his readers." 

Letter from Major J. H. Whittlesey, U. S. Army, 
Professor of Military Sciences in Cornell University : 

Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., Dec. 28, 1868. 
Gen. F. J. Lippitt : 

My Dear Sir: Accept my thanks for your publica- 
tions upon military science. I have perused them care- 
fully and believe them admirably adapted to the end in 
view, viz : the diffusion of military knowledge among of- 
ficers of the National militia, which, under institutions 
like ours, must ever be our chief reliance in war. They 



NOTICES. 

will form a valuable link in the chain of effort now being 
made to establish in the country a comprehensive system 
of military instruction based upon existing educational 
agencies, and urged upon national attention by the fear- 
ful lessons of the recent past. 

I am, sir, very respectfully yours, 

J. H. WHITTLESEY. 

The usual discount made to the trade. 

D. VAN NOSTRAND, 

23 Murray Street, 
NEW" YORK CITY. 



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